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Recent studies have suggested that media coverage and public opinion about 
biotechnology was similar to nuclear energy and other “emerging technologies.” To 
begin moving beyond individual cases and toward a broader theory, this study looks at 
a new emerging technology—nanotechnology—with the goal of attaining a better 
understanding of the complex interactions among media coverage, public opinion, and 
policy debates. The research attempts to provide two things: 1) an understanding of 
how the major news media have covered nanotechnology in recent years; and 2) a 
glimpse into public attitudes about nanotechnology in New York state. 
Presented first is a preliminary content analysis of nanotechnology coverage in 
the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and Associated Press for 
the period between January 1, 1986 and June 30, 2004. Media attention to 
nanotechnology seems to parallel coverage of biotechnology in its early stages of issue 
development—starting out low and rising sharply as it spreads from “elite” media 
outlets to general outlets. As with biotechnology, coverage of nanotechnology 
throughout this period is overwhelmingly positive, focusing on progress and potential 
economic benefits, and with little discussion of attendant risks. Nanotechnology 
coverage does, however, focus somewhat more on risks from the outset than 
biotechnology did, suggesting that issues of public accountability are growing more 
salient to journalists. Indeed, the “public accountability” frame appears surprisingly 
early in nanotechnology coverage and remains a significant element throughout. This 
frame appears more often than the “runaway” frame and on a par with the “Pandora’s 
Box” frame. This suggests that the media may be reflecting what risk communication 
scholars have long known: what really worry people are not scary “sci-fi” scenarios, 
  
 
but rather questions of trust and credibility, especially regarding public officials and 
multinational corporations. 
Also presented is a survey of public attitudes about the potential applications 
of nanotechnology in New York state. Telephone data were collected from February to 
March of 2005 from a randomly generated sample of New York residents (N=800). 
Nearly half of respondents said they had heard “not much at all” about 
nanotechnology, while only about 5% said they had heard “a great deal.” Of the 
people who were willing to make an assessment, 33.2% said “benefits will outweigh 
the risks”; 14.9% said “risks will outweigh the benefits”; and 52.0% said “risks and 
benefits will be about equal” (mean: 2.19; SD: 0.9). Support for nanotechnology 
significantly correlated with higher levels of education and family income. This 
suggests that nanotechnology is only something more “elite” people are paying 
attention to, which corresponds with results from the media content analysis. Support 
for nanotechnology also significantly correlated with how much a respondent had 
heard about nanotechnology. Given the very low awareness among respondents, quite 
a few people (more than 70%) were still willing to make assessments about an 
unfamiliar technology. 
When synthesized with other research on this topic, these findings suggest that 
the general public support for nanotechnology—despite very low levels of knowledge 
and awareness—may be linked to the overwhelmingly positive media coverage, which 
has been consistently framed in terms of progress and economic prospects. In 
combination with their preconceived attitudes about technology in general, people 
may be taking cues from the media to tell them how to think about this new emerging 
technology. Still, nanotechnology coverage amounts to a very small part of the overall 
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EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
Nanotechnology as a Public Issue 
Nanotechnology is the science of the very small, involving manipulation of 
atoms at the scale of a nanometer—one billionth of a meter, or about 80,000 times 
smaller than the width of a human hair. The field has been framed by some as the next 
industrial revolution, with the promise of producing lighter and stronger materials, 
energy-efficient manufacturing, advances in medical monitoring and bioremediation, 
much more powerful computers, and many others. As a public issue, however, 
nanotechnology is still in its infancy. Indeed, initial surveys show that most people 
haven’t even heard of “nano,” let alone formed opinions about it (Bainbridge, 2003; 
Cobb & Macoubrie, 2004; Scheufele & Lewenstein, 2005; Royal Society, 2004). But 
some groups in society—including businesspeople, politicians, and academics—are 
paying close attention to the development of this new scientific field. 
Scientists—especially chemists—have been doing work at the nano level for 
years. A recent search of Science Citation Index found that more than 1,400 scientific 
articles dealing with nanoscience and nanotechnology were published between 1982 
and February 2004 (Stephens, 2004). The number of publications is rising steadily, 
starting with only one in 1987 and increasing to 497 in 2003. Several scientific 
journals devoted specifically to nanotechnology have sprung up in recent years, 
including Nanotechnology, the Journal of Nanoparticle Research, Nano Letters, and 
Small. 
The U.S. federal government is also making nanotechnology a priority, 
investing heavily in new research because of its potential for improving both the 
welfare and the standing of the country. Federal funding for nanotechnology research 
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and development in the United States has increased from $116 million in 1997 to more 
than $1 billion in 2005, with the cumulative 5-year nanotechnology investment at $4.7 
billion under the Bush Administration. The business community is also investing in 
nanotechnology, with new companies sprouting up today as Internet and 
biotechnology companies did in the 1980s and 1990s. Many are eagerly jumping on 
the bandwagon and applying “nano” to their name, even if the moniker is not quite 
accurate. The National Science Foundation predicts that nanotechnology could 
become a $1 trillion global market by 2015, with the potential for staggering advances 
in pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, optics, and environmental remediation, to name 
but a few. 
Along with all of this “revolutionary rhetoric” (Hilgartner & Lewenstein, 
2004) come voices of caution and dissent. A number of interested actors are speaking 
up about the potential negative side of nanotechnology. Concerns focus on a number 
of topics: lab safety while working with nanoparticles; privacy issues, including the 
potential for invasive monitoring with “nanocameras”; political questions about where 
funding should go and who will benefit from potential technologies; and the various 
environmental effects of nanoparticles. In January 2003, for example, the Canadian 
ETC Group (2003) warned that nanotechnology is moving too fast without the proper 
studies of possible risks, suggesting a moratorium on research into molecular 
manufacturing. This same organization was instrumental in turning European public 
opinion against “Frankenfoods.”  
The issue is also slowly working its way into the popular media. In 2000, Bill 
Joy, then senior scientist at Sun Microsystems, wrote a widely cited article for Wired 
magazine suggesting that “the future doesn’t need us,” and questioning whether 
society is able to handle the implications of continuing development in robotics, 
genetic engineering, and nanotechnology (Joy, 2000). In 2004, a major story by 
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Washington Post science reporter Rick Weiss introduced many to the environmental 
implications of nanotechnology for the first time (Weiss, 2004). Michael Crichton’s 
recent sci-fi novel, Prey, is a story of self-replicating nanobots run wild (Crichton, 
2002). Nanotechnology has even made its way to the big screen, with cameo 
appearances in a number of popular movies, including Spiderman 2, The Hulk, and 
Terminator 3. 
And, in a sure sign that nanotechnology is beginning to seep into the public 
consciousness, an article recently appeared on Salon.com detailing how Rabbi Yehuda 
Berg, Madonna’s personal guide into Jewish mysticism, sees incredible similarities 
between Kabbalah and nanotechnology. Part of the article picks up on a key theme in 
the discourse about nanotechnology: 
The mantra in the nanotech industry is to learn from the mistakes made in 
biotechnology and the public rejection of genetically modified organisms. 
Partly to blame was a “top-down” attitude taken by a scientific establishment 
that was much too self-important to bother with public attitudes and 
perceptions. So, consideration of “societal and ethical implications” is No. 1 on 
the nanotech industry’s list. (Lovy, 2004) 
Scientists are increasingly realizing that the vast promise of new technologies 
like nanotechnology does not press forward in a vacuum, and that the public needs to 
be engaged “upstream” in development to discuss the challenges and opportunities 
presented by new technologies. From the scientists’ perspective, engagement can help 
prevent the type of backlash that occurred with nuclear power and genetically 
modified (GM) food. Scientists and policymakers need to consider implications, not 
just applications. From the public’s perspective, engagement is a tool for the exercise 
of democratic power, for using its ability to shape the development and use of new 
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technologies (Wilsdon & Willis, 2004; Dickson, 2001; Anon, 2003; Leshner, 2003; 
Leshner, 2005). 
At an October 2004 workshop for journalists about nanotechnology sponsored 
by the Kavli Institute at Cornell University, Curt Suplee, director of the Office of 
Legislative and Public Affairs for the National Science Foundation and former 
Washington Post science reporter, compared nanotechnology to climate change 
(Suplee, 2004). Suplee suggested that reporters got it wrong on climate change, using 
a “he said/she said” approach to covering the issue, rather than demonstrating the true 
weight of scientific consensus. This criticism has been leveled against science 
reporting in general by several communication scholars (Dearing, 1995; Stocking, 
1999). In Suplee’s view, reporting about nanotechnology is heading down this same 
road. But despite the various elements of public discussion listed above, Suplee 
argued, the issue of nanotechnology has not been framed in a definitive way, so the 
public is still essentially a “blank slate.” He suggested that reporters, academics, 
scientists, and institutions have the opportunity to do nanotechnology right, right from 
the start. 
To supplement anecdotal propositions such as this, this study attempts to 
provide a more quantitative understanding of two things: 1) how the major news 
media have covered nanotechnology in recent years, to gain a preliminary 
understanding of two particular dimensions of how the media represent the issue: 
salience and framing. (Salience is an indicator of the attention given to an issue, while 
framing shows what types of arguments are being mobilized.) 2) The study also 
provides a glimpse into public attitudes toward nanotechnology, with the goal of 
understanding the potential linkages between media coverage and public opinion of 
this latest “emerging technology.” 
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The Unique Nature of Nano 
The intense focus on societal issues surrounding nanotechnology, which is 
unusual in itself, hints at another aspect that sets it apart from other scientific 
advances. Not only have researchers looked at social and ethical issues, but 
nanotechnology is also a science aimed from the outset toward societal benefit. Some 
have suggested that, in the case of nanotechnology, “societal benefit” is simply a 
euphemism for “making stuff.” Nanotechnology represents what many see as a larger 
shift in emphasis in materials science away from testing theories and characterizing 
materials towards making useful products. To this end, the ever-expanding worldwide 
government investment in nanotechnology can perhaps be seen as an investment in 
national economic and commercial advantage. University scientists, who have long 
been viewed as dispassionate and above the fray, are also increasingly encouraged to 
undertake research that can be commercially exploited. 
A National Research Council review of the U.S. National Nanotechnology 
Initiative (“Small Wonders, Endless Frontiers”) explicitly underscores these themes, 
suggesting that nanotechnology is “ultimately about industrial competitive position, 
and the defining benefit is economic, as new technologies and products move from 
laboratories to commercial reality” (National Research Council, 2002, p. 3). The NNI 
was established primarily because nanotechnology is predicted to have “an enormous 
potential economic impact.” Societal and ethical implications are considered a vital 
component of the NNI, in order to prepare for and adjust to the unexpected impacts of 
this “second industrial revolution.” Note that the authors do not dub it the next 
scientific revolution. Indeed, some have even asked why we in the United States have 
a National Nanotechnology Initiative, and not a National Nanoscience initiative. The 
choice of terminology does not seem arbitrary. 
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Some have suggested that this focus on economic progress translates into a 
tangible benefit for industry, thus favoring the rich and powerful in society over the 
poor and powerless (Bainbridge, 2002; ETC Group, 2003). In the field of information 
technology, this has been expressed in the concept of the “digital divide”—the concern 
that disadvantaged groups will fail to benefit from computers and advanced 
communication networks. Similarly, some have spoken of a coming “nano divide,” if 
governments do not develop mechanisms to ensure that the benefits of nanotechnology 
are equitably distributed. The United Nations Millennium Project Task Force on 
Science, Technology and Innovation noted that nanotechnology is likely to be 
particularly important in the developing world, because it requires small amounts of 
labor, land, and maintenance; it is highly productive and inexpensive; and it requires 
only modest amounts of materials and energy. Nanotechnology also offers potential 
applications in health and water sanitation, food security, and the environment, which 
are key areas of need for the developing world. 
But some worry that the wealthy nations will control nanotechnology and 
sideline applications for developing countries. The ETC Group has already expressed 
concern that the control of nanotechnology research and development might remain 
firmly in the hands of industrialized nations, producing a bias towards applications 
that benefit rich countries but neglect the needs of the poor. Even as nanotechnology 
research is rapidly progressing, relatively few products are actually on the market. Of 
those that are available, none address these issues that are important for developing 
nations. Instead, they have focused on consumer applications such as sunscreens and 
stain-resistant pants. 
While it may exhibit certain peculiarities, nanotechnology can still arguably be 
viewed as the next link in a long chain of “emerging technologies”—a list that 
includes information technology, biotechnology, nuclear power, and others. Such 
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technologies are usually discussed in terms of specific examples, such as pollution-
eating nanobots and under-skin chips that carry personalized medical information. But 
Hilgartner and Lewenstein (2004) suggest that rather than simply viewing them as a 
collection of specific cases, much can be gained by seeing them as a general 
phenomenon. “From this perspective, what is most striking is that ‘emerging 
technologies’ have become a distinctive social world, a peculiar ‘speculative space’ 
found at the edges of technological systems, where innovations are being most 
actively constructed and transformed” (p. 1). In this dynamic space, emerging 
technologies are surrounded by their own culture, including various “speculators” 
making claims of promise or peril (Fortun, 2001). 
In public discourse, the notion of emerging technologies conveys unmistakable 
connotations of revolutionary potential. This “revolutionary rhetoric” often leads to 
visible controversy, and to compound matters, “many issues involving emerging 
technologies are hashed out under the glare of media spotlights.” 
Technological accidents such as the devastating 1984 chemical factory disaster 
in Bhopal, India, that killed thousands or the highly visible recent failure of the 
Columbia space shuttle can expose the hidden messiness of technological 
systems and the organizations responsible for managing them. Thus, it is no 
wonder that struggles to control the public display of information often 
develop. (Hilgartner & Lewenstein, 2004, p. 6) 
The concept of “revolution” is thoroughly overused and ill-defined in general 
discourse, as is its sister term, “paradigm.” The reliability of this “revolutionary 
rhetoric” is not always clear, but when the discourse takes place under the “glare of 
media spotlights,” it illuminates the distinctive space in which an emerging technology 




Setting the Agenda 
The mass media play an important role in policy-relevant issues, including 
those involving science and technology, providing the primary arena for debate among 
scientists, policymakers, industry, and other political and social interests. Not only do 
the media focus the attention of competing actors and the general public, but the media 
also shape how policy issues are defined. As Nisbet and Lewenstein (2002) have 
noted, “Recognizing the importance of media coverage in influencing policy 
outcomes, various competing interests or political actors often lobby the media to 
shape the attention and emphasis of coverage in a way that marshals support for their 
positions” (p. 362.) 
How media coverage of an issue affects public opinion is highly complex and 
contested, but a classic description suggests that the media “may not be successful 
much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in 
telling them what to think about” (Cohen, 1963). This simple, articulate statement set 
into motion an entire field of social science research that seeks to understand two very 
important things: 1) how an issue makes it onto the media, public, and/or policy 
agendas; and 2) how people form judgments about an issue given a limited amount of 
information. 
The observation came at a time when modern democratic theory was replacing 
classical theory, with its notion of “popular competence”—a citizenry that is fully 
capable of grasping the range of issues at hand with sufficient depth to participate 
actively in governing itself. Research has continually shown that even among people 
who hold strong political opinions, these opinions are often based on little or no 
factual information or knowledge, and that people tend to screen out potentially 
dissonant information, perceiving stimuli selectively in terms of preconceived notions 
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(Cobb & Elder, 1971). The role of the individual citizen began to take a back seat to 
the social requisites of a stable and responsive government. This new model led to a 
range of questions about how certain issues were selected to be considered within a 
political system—not questions about influence over individual decisions, but rather 
who or what yielded influence over the range and types of alternatives available in the 
public sphere. For as Schattschneider (1960) has noted, “The definition of the 
alternatives is the supreme instrument of power” (p. 68). 
This shift in democratic theory paralleled a shift in communication theory, 
which had originally focused primarily on the specific cognitive effects of mass media 
on individuals. The dominant theoretical position in mass communication research 
during the 1950s and 1960s was the limited effects model, first elaborated by Joseph 
Klapper (1960). His key observation, which was in stark contrast to the reigning 
“hypodermic needle” theory preceding him, was that media are more likely to 
reinforce or crystallize attitudes than to change them: “Mass communication ordinarily 
does not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, but rather 
functions among and through a nexus of mediating factors and influences” (p. 8). 
Klapper suggested that there are five mediating factors in the service of reinforcement: 
1) predispositions and the related processes of selective exposure, selective perception, 
and selective retention; 2) the groups, and the norms of groups, to which the audience 
members belong; 3) interpersonal dissemination of the content of communications; 4) 
the exercise of opinion leadership; and 5) the nature of mass media in a free enterprise 
society (p. 19). 
Klapper’s notion of opinion leadership became known in communication 
theory as “the two-step flow”—information flows from the media to opinion leaders, 
and then from opinion leaders to the public. He also noted that mass communication 
tends to reinforce societal norms, which is mainly due to the economic nature of media 
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organizations. A popular newspaper, magazine, or television show is meant to reach 
the widest audience possible, thus it is in the best interest of editors to avoid offending 
audience members at all costs. Klapper suggested that this can lead to a reinforcement 
of the status quo, since the safest path is often the much-maligned middle way. He also 
noted that with certain “ego-involved” issues, it is more difficult to change attitudes, 
which explains why advertising is often much more successful than mass media in 
affecting attitude change—one has much less invested in which shampoo brand they 
will buy than in their opinions on corporate governance or pollution. In general, 
Klapper stressed that the mass media does not change; it reinforces, whether it be 
cultural norms or individual opinions.  
At the same time, Marshall McLuhan (1964) extended the analysis of media 
effects beyond traditional modes of communication. He thought of a medium as an 
extension of the human body or the mind—any technology that can be considered an 
extension of the human being. McLuhan suggested that media come in pairs, with one 
“containing” the other. The medium that is contained is the message of the one 
containing it, but the effects of the latter are obscured for the user, who focuses on the 
former. This line of thinking led him to his oft-cited statement, “the medium is the 
message,” which means, quite simply, that the message itself has much less impact 
than the medium that delivers it. Any medium, McLuhan said, exerts its most 
important effect by changing the interplay among human sensory modalities, or the 
way our senses relate to one another. He categorized media into “hot” and “cool.” A 
hot medium provides a lot of information and requires little of the user, whereas a cool 
medium requires a great deal of user participation, but does not provide a lot of 
information. A telephone is a cool medium; its hot counterpart is a radio. Much has 
been written about McLuhan in the intervening years—particularly regarding his 
comment that the advent of television would re-tribalize our world into a “global 
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village”—but traditional media effects research headed in a decidedly different 
direction, returning the focus back to the message itself. 
Walter Lippmann (1965) was perhaps the first to explicitly link the media 
agenda with the public agenda in his extremely important book, Public Opinion. He 
spoke of “the world outside and the pictures in our heads,” and he suggested that the 
mass media was the pseudo-environment that connected these worlds together. To 
Lippmann, the accuracy of news reporting had become the “basic problem of 
democracy,” because, he believed, the power of public opinion had become greater 
than that of the legislative branch of government. He also suggested that the problem 
might not just be one of faulty information, but also “an unconscious channeling by 
the public of unfamiliar material into familiar, but deceptive, categories” (p. xii).  
Much of this work explains why it is important to examine public attitudes 
towards a topic such as nanotechnology, even though it can be argued that most 
members of the “general public” really know nothing about it. For such issues, people 
truly live in a pseudo-environment, with no direct knowledge of the topics they are 
reading about, whether the topic be laboratory studies or clinical trials. They must 
experience them second-hand, through the prism of a journalist’s interpretation. 
Lippmann eventually concluded that the problem of “the world outside and the 
pictures in our heads” could not be solved by better and more information. He was, in 
essence, the first to articulate the notion that has become a cliché for practitioners of 
science communication—the wholesale abandonment of the “deficit model,” which 
suggests that people will develop more favorable attitudes towards science if they are 
presented with more information about science. While citizens may operate in a 
pseudo-environment, their actions (whether they be voting or introducing legislation 
or making consumer decisions) are based decidedly in the real world. This explains 
why even uninformed opinion is worth examining—mass opinion affects policy 
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direction, even though it is routinely ill-informed. While mass preferences do not 
usually dictate scientific policy choices, public opinion can affect success or failure of 
new technologies and their products (Cobb, 2004).  
A classic example of the disconnect between real-world indicators of issue 
importance and media coverage was the “war on drugs.” During the mid-1980s, the 
issue of drug abuse became a hot topic on the media agenda, stimulated mainly by the 
drug-related death of basketball star Len Bias in 1986 and Nancy Reagan’s “Just Say 
No” campaign. Yet real-world indicators of drug use showed that drug-related deaths 
actually decreased during the 1980s. Research indicated that during this time the 
intense media coverage of drugs influenced both public opinion and policy decisions. 
According to Dearing and Rogers (1980), “The rise and fall of the drug issue on the 
national agenda in the late 1980s suggests that the agenda-setting process for this issue 
was a social construction, bearing little relationship to the objective indicator of deaths 
due to drugs in the United States. This social construction of the drug issue was 
mainly driven by the mass media” (p. 22). 
A similar situation occurred with AIDS in the 1980s. The spread of the issue of 
AIDS during this timeframe did not closely reflect the spread of the disease itself. 
According to Dearing (1989), both the number of survey questions asked about AIDS 
in public opinion polls and the mass media coverage of AIDS all increased over the 
six years from 1981 to 1987, suggesting that the agenda-setting function also extends 
to pollsters, i.e., media coverage tends to set the agenda for public opinion polls. Three 
major events catalyzed media coverage and polling during this time: 1) a mid-1983 
report that newborn babies in New York City had AIDS; 2) the actor Rock Hudson’s 
diagnosis with AIDS in the summer of 1985; and 3) the controversy about testing for 
AIDS in spring 1987 (p. 316). Yet the rise in coverage caused by these events did not 
accurately reflect the number of AIDS cases at the time. As Dearing noted, “Poll 
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results on a public issue like AIDS, when published and broadcast by the mass media, 
may reinforce the mass media’s agenda-setting function upon the public by 
legitimizing the mass media’s choice of an important issue” (p. 326). 
The first study to really look at agenda-setting scientifically was the so-called 
“Chapel Hill Study” (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). The researchers studied the role of 
the mass media in the 1968 presidential campaign in Chapel Hill, N.C., selecting 100 
undecided voters because they were presumably those most open or susceptible to 
campaign information. These voters were asked what they thought were the most 
important issues in the upcoming election, despite what any politicians said were the 
most important issues. Then the researchers measured the media’s most important 
issues via content analysis. They found an overwhelmingly strong correlation between 
the important issues stressed by both groups, which they considered evidence for an 
agenda-setting function of the mass media. McCombs and Shaw stressed that the 
correlation was pertinent to the salience of particular issues, not necessarily how 
people were going to vote. Yet these saliences are the incidental and inevitable 
byproduct of journalistic practice and tradition, stemming from the structural and 
organizational characteristics of the profession. And contrary to what Klapper might 
have predicted, voters attended reasonably well to all news, regardless of which 
candidate or party issue was stressed. This, they noted, was evidence for agenda-
setting, not for Klapper’s selective perception, which would have suggested that the 
correlations between voters and news about their own party should be strongest.  
McCombs (1994) also noted that some issues are especially salient to people 
even without any news coverage—e.g. unemployment or the cost of gasoline. Such 
issues, which literally obtrude in our daily lives, can be labeled as “obtrusive.” Other 
issues, which McCombs calls “unobtrusive,” are only put on the public agenda 
through media coverage: “What most Americans [know] about the situation in the 
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Middle East and U.S. foreign and military policy [comes] entirely from the news 
media” (p. 7). People have a “need for orientation” with these issues, McCombs 
suggests, which means that they are likely to be more susceptible to the agenda-setting 
function of the media. One might expect that scientific and technological issues would 
fall into this category, since people tend to have little real-world experience with them. 
Indeed, research shows that the majority of people learn about science after they 
graduate high school directly from the mass media. Yet McCombs also offers a 
counterargument that individuals sometimes have less interest in more distant, 
unobtrusive issues, thus lowering their need for orientation. It could just as well be 
argued that science issues fit snugly into this category, much to the chagrin of science 
enthusiasts everywhere. 
As agenda-setting research has progressed, a constant issue has been the 
question of causality: Do the high correlations between media coverage and public 
opinion simply indicate that the media are successful in matching their messages to 
audience interests? Theories from Klapper and others about the economic nature of 
media organizations seem to support such an argument, since editors have a strong 
interest in catering to their readers’ interests. The recent discussions about “civic 
journalism” also enter into this realm, as do the many and varied studies about the 
sociology of journalism. The issue has yet to be resolved, and researchers will no 
doubt continue exploring the complex interrelations of the media, policy, and public 
agendas (Bauer & Gaskell, 2002; Nisbet & Huge, 2007). But it is clear that the media 
play a very important role in elevating issues to the public and policy agendas, thus 
increasing their chances of receiving consideration by policymakers.  
This agenda-setting role of the media has been demonstrated in a range of 
scientific controversies, most recently biotechnology and stem cell research (Nisbet et 
al., 2003; Nisbet & Lewenstein, 2002; Nisbet, 2005; Brossard & Nisbet, 2007). In the 
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early stages of development, the mass media can be a major source of people’s ideas 
about a new technology. Thus it is important to gauge how various media outlets are 
treating nanotechnology, in an attempt to understand the overall climate surrounding 
the issue.  
The agenda-setting function of the media also extends to questions of scientific 
risk and uncertainty. Technical risk assessment focuses narrowly on the probability of 
events and the magnitude of specific consequences, defining “risk” by the 
multiplication of the two terms. Yet social scientists and sociologists have suggested 
that risk events interact with psychological, social, and cultural processes in ways that 
can heighten or attenuate public perceptions of risk and related risk behavior (Douglas 
& Wildavsky, 1982; Kasperson, 1992). One of the main processes that can act to 
either amplify or attenuate risk occurs through the mass media. 
Journalistic norms require “objectivity,” which usually translates to the 
journalist acting as a sort of scribe and simply telling someone else’s story through 
quotes and other attributions. This can allow various “actors” to take the stage in 
media stories, and when it comes to scientific issues, these actors are frequently 
government officials and scientists. Communication researchers have long studied 
how news consumers use the media, but more recently scholars have begun to 
recognize how the media are used (and perhaps abused) by others, including scientists.  
Bucchi (1998) notes that scientists are by no means extraneous to the 
presentation of science by the daily press or by television, but rather they use the 
media in various ways to perpetuate their own needs and interests. For example, in the 
debate about the Big Bang sparked by data from NASA’s Cosmic Background 
Explorer (COBE) in 1992, scientists turned to the public as a means of settling the 
dispute. In this case, the Big Bang became a boundary object allowing different actors 
to interact at the public level. Another, and perhaps more cynical, view has also 
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emerged in relation to how scientists use the media. This is exemplified by what 
Hilgartner (1990) has termed the “dominant view” of popularization. He argues that 
this conception rests on a two-stage model: scientists develop genuine knowledge and 
then popularizers spread streamlined versions to the public. Hilgartner suggests that 
the dominant view serves scientists as a powerful tool for sustaining the social 
hierarchy of expertise. The dominant view, he notes, sets science aside and says that 
the public cannot access it. 
Nelkin (1995), in her critical look at science writing for the general public in 
the United States, revealed the constraints and biases of journalists and the 
surprisingly forceful public relations strategies of scientists, universities, corporations, 
and the government. She demonstrated how science journalists often act as promoters 
and “sellers” of science and technology, depicting scientists as miracle workers and 
magicians. Nelkin highlighted the “shared culture” between science journalists and 
scientists, which often leads science writers to favor information sources that are 
predominantly from scientific institutions—whether they be scientists or public 
information officers. They also rely heavily on routine channels of information within 
the scientific community, including news releases, professional meetings, science 
journals, and press conferences. This shared culture between scientists and journalists 
leads to a common and lamentable “gee whiz” brand of coverage, which usually 
serves the scientific community more than the public, Nelkin suggests.  
The influence of science on what gets covered in the media also extends to 
how it gets covered. Dunwoody (1999) suggests a pattern that once a science topic 
becomes news, mainstream science’s notion of what matters continues to drive the 
interpretive framework of stories. For example, in the debate over recombinant DNA 
in the 1970s, scholars who studied media coverage found that mainstream scientists 
played a much greater role in setting the media agenda than did community leaders or 
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scientific outliers. As a result, Dunwoody notes, coverage emphasized recombinant 
DNA as a scientific or technical challenge, not as a philosophical, political, or safety 
issue. 
Dunwoody suggests that scientists have successfully set the agenda for media 
science coverage, and part of the reason that she and others suggest is that science 
journalists are not as skeptical as they should be (Crewdson, 1993). A problem that 
arises, however, is how a journalist can handle competing claims from scientists when 
the journalist does not have the technical knowledge to sufficiently scrutinize the 
information. One less well-known example of such a case involves an inquiry ordered 
by the Canadian government in 1974 to study the social, economic, and environmental 
impact of a pipeline to carry natural gas in the Canadian western Arctic. The inquiry 
lasted for three years, generating extensive debate over the impact of pipelines on the 
biota of the western Arctic. In this case, different organizations enlisted scientists to 
provide expert testimony. These experts polarized into two camps: critics and 
defenders (Campbell, 1985). 
The event demonstrates how people use not only scientific information, but 
also lack of information—i.e., uncertainty. Campbell (1985) found a strong tendency 
among scientists allied with critics of the pipeline to argue that the knowledge base 
regarding environmental impacts was inadequate to push forward with the plan. On 
the other hand, scientists allied with defenders of the pipeline also spoke of gaps in 
knowledge, but they used these “ignorance claims” to assert that the potential 
problems were insignificant and not worthy of holding up the project (Stocking, 
1999). Both sides constructed scientific ignorance in different ways, using it as a 
“strategic element in expert arguments” (Campbell, 1985, p. 447). 
Journalists often pick up on these arguments, portraying stories in a classic “he 
said/she said” style. Part of this stems from the norm of journalistic objectivity, and 
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part is a holdover from methods of political journalism that do not necessarily work 
for science issues. But the above example suggests that scientific controversies 
naturally fall into such a format, even among scientists. This style has been criticized 
from many sectors, especially when journalists give space to “maverick scientists,” as 
some have in the current debate on climate change, despite an overwhelming 
consensus among scientists about the cause of climate change (Dearing, 1995). 
Stocking (1999) suggests that this “strategic ritual of objectivity” permits 
corporate and other institutional interests to amplify their claims, thus giving them a 
privileged place in news coverage. Interestingly, it can also be used to give legitimacy 
to maverick scientists and others who are far from being institutionalized. Either way, 
however, the consensus among scholars seems to be that this strategic ritual is hardly 
the best approach to science reporting. 
 
Making the News 
The debate about journalistic objectivity and “bias” is not exclusive to science 
writing, and it certainly is not new. Many of these themes were presaged by 
sociologists in the 1970s and early 1980s, who pointed to the norm of objectivity as 
one among many conventions and organizational constraints that lead reporters to 
choose the stories they write about and the sources they rely upon for information. 
 Cobb and Elder (1971) began by asking questions about whom or what 
yielded influence over the range and types of alternatives considered in the public 
sphere, focusing on how different interest groups articulate grievances and transform 
them into viable issues that require decision makers to take action. Modern democratic 
theory, they argued, cannot explain how at some particular time a previously dormant 
issue can be transformed into a highly salient political controversy when the basis of 
the grievance has existed for some time. The inertia of the political system makes it 
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extremely difficult to get an issue on the agenda and to facilitate any sort of change in 
the cavernous bureaucracies of federal and state governments. They noted several 
characteristics of groups that explain their differing abilities to get issues noticed: 
some groups have more resources than others or are better able to mobilize those 
resources; some groups are held in greater public esteem than others and thus can 
command greater access to decision makers (e.g., doctors, lawyers, church leaders); 
and some groups are located so strategically in the social or economic structure of 
society that their interests cannot be ignored. For example, “Farmers have an inherent 
advantage over minority groups in getting the system to respond positively to their 
needs because there are many decision makers who identify with farm groups and the 
pivotal position of agriculture in the American economy” (p. 908). 
In the end, however, it often seems to come down to power, which in practice 
typically translates into money. A recent example can be found in President George 
W. Bush’s “American Competitiveness Initiative,” which he announced during the 
2006 State of the Union Address. The initiative called for a doubling within 10 years 
of the federal commitment to basic research in the physical sciences, as well as 
programs to stimulate scientific and technical education in the United States. Scientists 
and educators have been warning for years of America’s potential crisis of 
competitiveness in science and engineering, but in this instance it took something 
more to elevate the issue to the President’s agenda: “What was different this year, 
according to a number of Capitol Hill lobbyists and Silicon Valley executives, was 
support on the issue by Republican corporate executives like Craig R. Barret, the 
chairman of Intel, and John Chambers, the chief executive of Cisco Systems” 
(Markoff, 2006). 
Cobb and Elder were mainly interested in the policy agenda, but they also 
noted the potential for the media to play an important role in elevating issues to the 
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systemic agenda and increasing their chances of receiving consideration on 
institutional agendas. Certain individuals in the public sphere act as opinion leaders, 
bringing publicity to particular issues by commenting on them or even adopting these 
issues as their own. Some opinion leaders are simply people who appear frequently in 
the news, such as Jesse Jackson. When they speak or appear in public, it becomes 
news, whether or not they have anything substantial to say. Other opinion leaders can 
be pundits whose writings appear in the editorial pages or whose musings appear on 
talk shows and network news broadcasts. Thomas Friedman, an editorial columnist for 
the New York Times, is a good example. He also played an instrumental role in raising 
policymakers’ concerns about this country’s flagging competitiveness in math and 
science by writing columns about the topic and referring often to it in his best-selling 
book, The World is Flat. 
By spending a significant amount of time in the newsrooms of the New York 
Times and the Washington Post, Leon Sigal (1973) shed light on the symbiotic and 
often uncomfortable relationship reporters have with officials, who are reporters’ main 
source of news. He notes that news content has been explained through the years in a 
number of ways, including the selective processes of individual reporters; the 
technological considerations of the medium involved (a la McLuhan); the business 
nature of news organizations, with advertising rather than circulation driving profits; 
as well as the unequal amount of influence imposed by owners and publishers. Yet all 
of these explanations are based upon rational decisions by unitary actors, whereas 
“newsmen” (as Sigal refers to them) don’t work on their own, but in large, 
bureaucratic organizations. Sigal suggests that newsmaking is a consensual process—
the product of the choices of many, not of a single actor, no matter how powerful he 
may be. These choices, however, are governed by a set of shared values or 
conventions that lead to U.S. government officials dominating the news. 
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Journalism is filled with uncertainty. What counts as “news”? Who makes for a 
reliable source? Which parts of a story should be emphasized, and which should be 
left out? For reporters, conventions are essential in managing this uncertainty, and 
they are a key aspect of the consensual nature of the news. Reporters often turn to the 
consensus of their peers to determine what counts as news, following up on a story 
only after another prominent media outlet has covered the topic. This practice makes 
for an interesting paradox. On one hand, reporters are always looking for a “scoop,” to 
be the first person to write about a story. Yet at the same time, they want validation 
from their peers that a story is newsworthy, so they want to see something having been 
written about first by someone else. For Sigal, understanding these processes behind 
how the news gets made is a pre-requisite for understanding what news means (p. 
186). 
When faced with unstructured, non-routine occurrences, newsmen try to fit 
them into a pattern congruent with these conventions, Sigal notes, and he outlines 
several of them (p. 66): objective reporting, reliance upon authoritative sources, news 
pegs, exclusives, inverted pyramids, simplification, and others. Reporting thus 
becomes an almost ritualistic process, where journalists define what news is and how 
they will cover it based primarily on instinct. For example, by covering only topics 
that can be simplified easily and squeezed into a specified structure, many important 
but complex areas of science or policy get ignored, even though readers might benefit 
from a deeper understanding of these topics. 
Sigal’s chief point is that the constraints of newsmaking and the conventions of 
reporting mean that journalists end up relying on routine news channels, which gives 
sources the opportunity to exploit them. Journalism is one of the few professions in 
which the practitioners rely almost completely on the “good will” of their information 
sources to make their product, without offering any payment in return. A good 
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example is the prevalence of “the exclusive.” By offering exclusive information to a 
reporter at a time that is convenient to a source, and likewise withholding information 
when it is inconvenient, sources hold sway over reporters as gatekeepers of 
information. This type of interaction usually applies to government officials, but the 
same principle works in the world of science. Most reporters don’t have time to mine 
all of the scientific literature or to keep track of the research activities at every 
university or laboratory, so they are often at the mercy of the scientific institutions that 
put out press releases and hold press conferences, as Nelkin (1995) noted. 
Even the way news organizations are structured leads to reliance upon routine 
sources of information, according to Sigal (p. 127). The beat system, for example, 
concentrates reporters in locations where they are likely to get news through routine 
channels, particularly major cities and the nation’s capital, Washington, D.C. These 
routine channels are the mechanism by which officials—mainly from the U.S. 
government—dominate the news, because a disproportionate number of reporters are 
assigned to the White House, Congress, and the various arms of the federal 
bureaucracy. The same is true with science. Most science writers focus mainly on a 
few major journals (Science and Nature) and scientific meetings (American 
Association for the Advancement of Science) to find their stories, which gives those 
particular “officials” the chance to dominate the news. Science reporters also turn to 
the same elite institutions ostensibly because of their reputation for quality, but 
perhaps also simply because of name recognition, which gives other institutions less of 
a chance to convey their work, even when it is of major importance. Likewise, 
reporters maintain a stable of contacts that they inevitably turn to for any kind of 
theme, almost as a knee-jerk reaction, which gives certain scientists repeated 
opportunities to interpret scientific results in the media (Dunwoody, 1980). 
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When a newsroom relies on a small group of sources, the sources themselves 
tend to be larger organizations. These larger organizations may not offer better 
information, but simply have more ability to provide a consistent flow of information 
than the smaller source with fewer staff (Berkowitz, 1987). 
Beat specialization can also cause reporters to become too close to sources. As 
Sigal put it, “From routine reliance it is but a short step to dependence” (p. 106). For 
example, the uncritical coverage in the early years of the manned space program may 
not have been due solely to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s 
(NASA) success at news management, according to Sigal (p. 48). “Many of the 
journalists covering Apollo were so caught up in the drama of the space race that they 
came to regard themselves as part of the NASA ‘team.’ The technical language that 
they used in talking to NASA personnel set them apart from other journalists and 
contributed to ‘team’ solidarity.” The result is that reporters may become 
spokespeople for their news sources rather than dispassionate observers, becoming 
sloppy about recognizing that alternative views may exist. After the Challenger 
disaster, a number of reporters on the NASA beat switched assignments because their 
editors felt they had become too close to the organization to recognize the structural 
problems within NASA that may have led to the incident (Boot, 1986; Lewenstein, 
1993). 
In light of the potential for exploitation of reporters, what explains the reliance 
upon conventions and routine sources of information in the journalism profession? 
Most of the conventions can’t be explained by economic self-interest, Sigal claims, 
but rather the ideological richness of the “journalist’s creed” is strongly associated 
with the existence of role strains that the creed might ease. “A number of the tenets of 
the creed seem to be associated with a strain resulting from the newsman’s 
involvement and intimate knowledge of the policy-making process in Washington 
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without the status and power that accrues to officials who are as deeply involved” (p. 
90). 
To complicate the matter, news sources of all stripes have adjusted their 
thinking and tailored their actions to play to these conventions and routines, in order to 
get maximum exposure for their views. For example, by releasing long speeches or 
reports to journalists ahead of time on an embargoed basis, officials can steer reporters 
to the sections that they want to emphasize (p. 106). It seems that the attitude among 
officials and other sources has become that the news is too important to be left to 
reporters. This has led to an explosion of growth in the public relations industry, 
especially in sectors where such activities have not traditionally been encouraged or 
sought after, such as science. Nelkin (1995) notes that scientists were not traditionally 
interested in public visibility, but rather they feared it could result in external controls 
on their work. But these attitudes have changed in recent years, as scientists have 
become increasingly dependent on corporate support of research or direct 
congressional appropriations. They see that scholarly communication with peers is no 
longer sufficient and that gaining national visibility through the mass media can be 
crucial to securing the financial support required to run major research facilities and to 
assuring favorable public policies toward science and technology (p. 133) (Leshner, 
2003; Lane, 1996). Institutions of all varieties are realizing that they can get their 
message out by tapping professionals with knowledge of journalistic conventions and 
the ability to exploit them (not necessarily in the negative sense of the term). 
Herbert Gans (1980) echoed many of Sigal’s critical points in his study of CBS 
Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time. He found that a very small 
number of “knowns”—people of influence such as presidents, CEOs, federal and state 
officials, etc.—appeared repeatedly in his content analysis of these media outlets. And 
national news was operationally defined as the federal government, much as Sigal 
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found in his study of reporters and government officials. When “unknowns” do appear 
in the news, they are unrepresentative of normal people: criminals, deviants, or 
individuals exhibiting any sort of strange behavior. What ordinary people do rarely 
makes the news, according to Gans. 
Gans suggests that, despite a pretense to objectivity, journalists make value 
judgments all the time. There is, underlying the news, a picture of how society ought 
to be; values come through in what actors or activities are reported or ignored, and 
how they are described and framed (p. 40). Gans lists several enduring values that 
appear frequently in the news: ethnocentrism, altruistic democracy, responsible 
capitalism, small-town pastoralism, individualism, moderatism, social order, and 
national leadership. For example, news about democracy is generally treated as a 
friendly political contest with winners and losers, but not an outright battle between 
forces of good and evil. Likewise, extreme behavior is often featured in the news, but 
it is almost universally criticized. By focusing on extremism and disaster (disorder), 
news is implicitly favoring moderatism and order (p. 57). And the news does not just 
reflect a generic brand of order, but specifically a “white male social order.” Most 
news is about affluent people, and upper-middle-class practices are thus universalized 
as if they are shared by most Americans. When underrepresented minorities and 
women are featured, they are generally aspiring to or assimilating into this order. The 
news pays attention to and upholds the actions of elite individuals and elite 
institutions, focusing primarily on leaders who promote and restore order. 
Journalists must routinize their task to make it manageable, relying on what 
Gans calls “considerations”—the unwritten rules that journalists apply to manage their 
work. (Sigal called these conventions; others have referred to them as norms or even 
strategic rituals.) Reporters don’t make conscious decisions about news, but rely 
instead on quick, intuitive judgments or “feel” (p. 82), and the application of these 
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judgments requires consensus among journalists. For reporters, many story ideas come 
from other stories, seeking a new angle on something that is already news. This is 
partly because the story has already been judged newsworthy by a peer, such as the 
New York Times, which has been called the primary peer source for reporters, 
especially those covering science.  
Gans also reviews several theories of how stories get selected: journalist-
centered theories, based on an autonomous and ideological individual; organizational 
theories that consider the economic constraints of newsmaking and the division of 
labor in news organizations; event-centered theories, including the notion that events 
dictate the news, and journalists simply hold up a mirror to these events; and 
deterministic theories, such as the technological determinism of McLuhan. For Gans, 
however, news is primarily “the exercise of power over the interpretation of reality.” 
Of all the considerations that dictate journalistic routines, those governing the choice 
of sources are the most significant. The question of access is the most salient. Gans 
describes the process of newsmaking as an intricate dance between sources and 
reporters, as each seeks access to each other (p. 116). And more often than not, it is the 
sources that do the leading, because journalists are generally short-staffed and don’t 
have the time or the means to actively seek breaking news in the enterprising fashion 
that they might prefer. 
Four factors shape access to journalists, according to Gans (p. 117): incentives, 
power, the ability to supply suitable information, and geographic and social proximity. 
Access to reporters generally reflects the social structure outside of the newsroom, 
with the elite and powerful more readily available to reporters. The powerless must 
resort to civil disturbances to obtain access, whereas at the other end of the social 
spectrum, the president has unlimited access to reporters. Affluent organizations have 
at their disposal any number of tools to influence the journalistic process, including 
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the ability to pre-schedule activities to meet reporters’ deadlines and need for content 
(p. 122). 
On the other side of the coin, for journalists, the main consideration when 
determining the suitability of a source is efficiency. Reporters are always in a hurry, 
and news organizations must be efficient, above all other things, because they are 
expected to deliver the latest news to the audience at a prescheduled time. Similarly, 
“past suitability” is an important factor as well, which leads to reliance upon the same 
stable of sources because the reporter knows they can be trusted and are easy to turn to 
under tight deadlines. Other considerations also lead to elite sources dominating the 
news, according to Gans. Reporters consider authoritativeness to be a key factor, 
which gives priority to public officials, heads of organizations, and certain other 
respected groups in society, such as doctors and academics. Articulateness is another 
consideration, which helps certain people who are adept at speaking in sound bytes get 
more attention, because they make a reporter’s job easier to do, even if what they are 
saying lacks substance. 
In a related strand of thought, sociologist Gaye Tuchman, in her book Making 
News (1978), contends that news is the social construction of reality. The book is 
based on a series of participant observations in media newsrooms and interviews of 
newspeople over a period of 10 years. The act of making news, Tuchman says, is the 
act of constructing reality itself rather than a picture of reality (p. 12). She asserts that 
the news is an ally of legitimated institutions and that it also legitimates the status quo. 
Tuchman links news professionalism and news organizations to the emergence of 
corporate capitalism. She argues that news is a social resource whose construction 
limits an analytic understanding of contemporary life (p. 215). She contends that 
“through its routine practices and the claims of news professionals to arbitrate 
knowledge and to present factual accounts, news legitimates the status quo” (p. 14) 
28 
Gans, however, makes an important distinction between agency beat reporters 
and substantive beat reporters. Agency beat reporters cover one specific branch of the 
bureaucracy, and thus they have to work closely with sources, which means they have 
to be careful what they write so it doesn’t upset the sources that they are dependent 
upon (p. 133). Substantive beat reporters, on the other hand, don’t become participant-
observers in one agency, but instead rely on sources that are more spread out 
geographically and professionally. The resulting relationship is less symbiotic, but it 
still can lead to a kind of shared culture. These reporters develop close relationships 
with a few trusted resources, and they often become ambassadors for their specialty, 
which makes them even more sought-out by sources looking to promote their own 
views. And general reporters are a different breed altogether. There is typically much 
more uncertainty involved in their work, since they will frequently know nothing 
about a topic about which they must write a story on deadline. This leads them to lean 
even more heavily on “authoritative” sources, because they can’t invest the time and 
effort into determining the quality of a source. And they also tend to develop a herd 
mentality, according to Gans, relying extensively upon the exchange of information 
with their peers. It turns out that the majority of news is actually gathered by 
generalists, which means that specialists like the science writer lead an uneasy 
existence in a generalist profession (Dunwoody, 1980). 
The work of Sigal, Gans, and Tuchman highlights a tension among scholars: 
the issue of power as a causative agent. In essence, this is a “chicken and egg” 
problem. On one hand, scholars point to the structure of the journalism profession, and 
even to the inherent merit of the issues themselves, as the primary causative factors 
that put an issue on the agenda. As Dearing and Rogers (1996) put it, “Understanding 
how democracy works can be better achieved by studying the power of issues rather 
than the issue of power” (p. 16). On the other hand, some scholars suggest that 
29 
reporters are simply pawns in the hands of institutional powers that exert influence on 
behalf of their own parochial interests. Still others describe the process as a consensual 
transaction between journalists and their sources. 
No clear reconciliation of this tension has emerged, but many scholars in 
recent years have shifted their focus from power as a causative agent to the 
relationships of power and activity that link institutions, policymakers, and the public 
(Lewenstein, 2005). In the world of science, this has led to a better understanding of 
what the field “science and the public” is all about. “Two major results have emerged 
from this research tradition: a distinction between ‘deficit models’ of public 
understanding and more nuanced contextual models, and an interest in participatory 
models for engaging the public in science, especially in science policy” (p. 170). 
Another outcome is a renewed focus on how people process information and form 
attitudes about science and technology. 
 
Framing 
One way to synthesize the sociological view of the journalism profession with 
agenda-setting theory is with the concept of “framing,” which implies that messages 
are often presented (or framed) in a particular way, and different ways of presenting 
the same information influence the way audiences interpret the messages. Reframing 
an issue is critical for changing audience interpretations. 
Framing first gained prominence in the writings of Erving Goffman. His notion 
of a frame includes definitions of a situation that are built up in accordance with 
principles of organization that govern events, and his goal was to isolate basic 
frameworks in society for making sense out of these events (Goffman, 1974). Gamson 
and Modigliani (1989) and Gamson (1992) were perhaps first to apply this concept to 
the mass media, originally in a study of media discourse about nuclear power, and 
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then extending the analysis to three other issues demonstrating “collective action” 
frames: affirmative action, troubled industry, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Gamson 
suggests that when engaging in political talk, “People are not so passive, [p]eople are 
not so dumb, and [p]eople negotiate with media messages in complicated ways that 
vary from issue to issue” (p. 4). He notes that mass media is a very important tool in 
framing an issue, but not the only tool, as some communication scholars might like to 
believe. Likewise, conventional wisdom in the world of political science has always 
caused one to wonder how people can manage to have opinions about so many matters 
about which they lack even the most elementary understanding. But to Gamson, there 
are other kinds of knowledge, including experiential knowledge and popular wisdom, 
which people integrate with media discourse to form a “frame” of understanding about 
an issue. 
When a group is trying to win support for an issue, it is labels that are often the 
target of symbolic action. Controlling the way an issue is labeled in the media and 
popular discourse is often the first battle toward winning the war, amounting to 
defining what the debate is actually about. For example, with the abortion debate, 
which is now a classic example of framing, the pro-life side is suggesting that the 
issue is about a baby’s life, whereas the pro-choice side is trying to argue that the issue 
is about a woman’s choice. Gamson calls attention to affirmative action in this regard 
(p. 9). For proponents of affirmative action, the issue is about remediation of the sins 
of the past, but for opponents, it is about reverse discrimination. As mentioned above, 
it seems that the overwhelming use of the term “nanotechnology” as opposed to 
“nanoscience” suggests that one side has already succeeded in winning this battle over 
labels. 
But sometimes other factors come into play that are outside of a pressure 
group’s control. The journalistic convention of telling “stories” dictates that articles 
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almost always focus on motivated actors in a debate, rather than the structural causes 
of events (p. 34). And not all symbols are equally potent, according to Gamson. 
“Some metaphors soar, others fall flat; some visual images linger in the mind, others 
are quickly forgotten. Some frames have a natural advantage because their ideas and 
language resonate with a broader political culture” (p. 135). Journalists often use 
media frames as guidelines in helping them select what information to spotlight and 
what to ignore: “Facts take their meaning by being framed in some fashion” (p. 120). 
In his study of these four issues, Gamson found a strong relationship between 
injustice frames in media discourse and injustice frames in popular discourse. When 
no injustice frame was present, there was no moral indignation about an issue, which 
made it difficult to stir up discontent and support. This is one reason why opposition to 
nuclear power was never as vehement as it could have been, because people found it 
difficult to perceive injustice in a situation if a nuclear power plant was not going to be 
placed in their town. And for the four different issues, there was a different emphasis 
on each of the three knowledge mechanisms: media discourse, experiential 
knowledge, and popular wisdom. For nuclear power, people tended to get their initial 
information from the media, and then they would fall back on popular wisdom about 
technology and nature to form their positions. But rarely did anyone have experiential 
knowledge of nuclear power plants, making the issue what Gans would call 
“unobtrusive.” As noted earlier, most scientific and technical issues fall into this 
category, since few people have experiential knowledge of them. 
The specific frames that played out in each issue are also linked to broader 
cultural themes common to many issues, according to Gamson. In the nuclear power 
debate, the broader themes on the pro-side are technical progress and mastery over 
nature, while the counter-themes are harmony with nature and technology run amok. 
Again, many technological issues share these frames, including biotechnology and 
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nanotechnology. For Gamson, this suggests a different way of looking at the long-
standing debate over the magnitude and nature of media effects on public opinion. The 
effects discussed here are effects in use: “Instead of treating media content as a 
stimulus that leads to some change in attitudes or cognition, it is treated as an 
important tool or resource that people have available, in varying degrees, to help them 
make sense of issues in the news” (p. 180). 
In his analysis of media coverage of the emergence of the New Left movement 
in the late 1960s and 1970s, Gitlin (2003) shows in detail how the media first ignore 
new political developments, then frame aspects of the story that treat these movements 
as oddities. As Gans (1979) found in his media study, the media portray a picture of 
the world in line with the status quo, the accepted social order. According to Gitlin, 
“The news that man has bitten dog carries an unspoken morality: it proposes to coax 
men to stop biting those particular dogs, so that the world can be restored to its 
essential soundness. The media divide movements into legitimate main acts and 
illegitimate sideshows” (p. 6). And Gitlin suggests that journalistic routines naturally 
lead to this type of framing. Simply by doing their jobs, he says, journalists tend to 
serve the political and economic elite definitions of reality. Frames, according to 
Gitlin, are principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit 
theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters. Media frames are largely 
unspoken and unacknowledged, but they serve to organize the world both for 
journalists who report it and for those who rely on their reports. These frames are 
“persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, 
emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, 
whether verbal or visual” (p. 7). 
Gitlin draws together a theory of news coverage suggesting that mass media 
have become core systems for the distribution of ideology—a form of anti-democratic 
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social management. Mass media exerts its influence through a similar process as what 
Antonio Gramsci described as hegemony—a ruling class’s domination of subordinate 
classes and groups through the elaboration and penetration of ideology into their 
common sense and everyday practice. It is the systematic (but not necessarily 
deliberate) engineering of mass consent to the established order (p. 253). Normally the 
dominant frames are taken for granted by reporters. Hegemony necessarily operates 
outside consciousness, Gitlin says, and it is exercised by professionals who view 
themselves as pursuing the seemingly neutral goal of informing the public. Gitlin also 
sees this process at work in media treatment of the anti-nuclear and other later 
movements: “In today’s world, political movements feel called upon to rely on large-
scale communications in order to matter, . . . but in the process they become 
‘newsworthy’ only by submitting to the implicit rules of newsmaking, by conforming 
to journalistic notions of what a ‘story’ is, what an ‘event’ is, what a ‘protest’ is” (p. 
3). 
Entman (1993) notes that framing has become a “fractured” paradigm in the 
social sciences, with no general statement of a framing theory or how frames make 
their way into texts. He suggests that the field of communication can synthesize the 
disparate uses of this concept, and he offers his own definition: 
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described. (p. 52, italics in original) 
Scheufele (1999) further synthesized the fragmented approaches to framing 
theory by breaking previous approaches down along two dimensions: the type of 
frame examined (media frames vs. audience frames) and the way frames are 
operationalized (independent variable or dependent variable). Studies of frames as 
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dependent variables often examine the factors that influence the creation of frames, 
and Scheufele notes that journalists’ framing of an issue can be influenced by several 
social and organizational variables. Researchers have identified at least five factors 
that can potentially influence how journalists frame a given issue: social norms and 
values, organizational pressures and constraints, pressures of interest groups, 
journalistic routines, and ideological or political orientations of journalists (p. 109). 
All of these factors will be familiar from the above discussion about “making the 
news.” 
Others have looked more explicitly at how journalists cover scientific and 
environmental issues. Downs (1972) has suggested that public attention to issues such 
as the environment characteristically passes through five stages: (1) a pre-problem 
stage that leads to (2) a period of alarmed discovery associated with specific problems 
or hazards. Then (3) the public realizes the cost of making significant progress, thus 
followed by (4) a gradual decline of intense public interest, which finally leads to (5) 
the post-problem phase, in which attention toward the issue settles down, although at a 
higher level than that at which the cycle was initiated and subject to what Down calls 
“spasmodic recurrences of interest.” Downs argues that environmental issues are 
naturally susceptible to these issue-attention cycles because of inherent aspects in the 
issues themselves. These inherent aspects shape public and media attention (and non-
attention), according to this theory. 
Downs’ formulation has been criticized for a number of reasons, including his 
focus on the linear nature of issue-attention cycles. McComas and Shanahan (1999) 
suggest that a narrative perspective provides one avenue for reconciling these 
criticisms. They argue that it is a matter of social, institutional, and communicational 
choices to construct issues in certain ways, not that a particular issue has an inherent 
level of pre-given excitement. Journalists, they say, seek not only to cover inherently 
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exciting issues, but also to construct issues as exciting. In their analysis of climate 
change stories in the New York Times and the Washington Post between 1980 and 
1995, they found that media attention to global warming was cyclical, and the authors 
suggest that the ability of journalists to construct narratives influenced these attention 
cycles. 
This notion is fairly intuitive; journalists are always looking for “the story.” 
But it also fits with a strand of communication theory first presented in detail by 
Walter Fisher. Narrative Paradigm Theory (Fisher, 1987) suggests that humans are 
essentially “storytelling animals,” and therefore narratives subsume all other forms of 
communication. Rationality is determined by the nature of persons as narrative 
beings—their inherent awareness of narrative probability, what constitutes a coherent 
story, and their constant habit of testing narrative fidelity, whether the stories they 
experience ring true with the stories they know to be true in their lives. In short, the 
way humans make their decisions is through stories that offer “good reasons” to act 
one way or the other. The logic of good reasons is the method of determining a good 
story, based essentially on the criteria of narrative probability and narrative fidelity. 
As Gamson noted above, all metaphors and images are not equally potent. Some 
frames have a natural advantage because they resonate with the broader culture—in 
other words, they have more narrative fidelity. 
In a similar vein, Nisbet et al. (2003) found that media attention to stem cell 
research peaked when the issue was most easily dramatized, and that the potential for 
drama was maximized when the issue shifted from administrative policy contexts to 
overtly political arenas such as Congress and the Presidency, where elevated levels of 
agenda-building are more likely to occur. Here, stories can be reported (or framed) 
using familiar storytelling themes and formats, including matters of political 
controversy and ethics/morality. Journalists working on a political beat are also more 
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likely to cover topics in these arenas, and newspapers tend to feature political 
reporting more prominently than science reporting. 
Brossard et al. (2004) extended the discussion of issue-attention cycles to 
include cultural factors. In their cross-cultural comparison of newspaper coverage of 
global warming in France and the United States, they found that French coverage was 
more event-based, focused on international relations, and presented a more restricted 
range of viewpoints on global warming than American coverage did. They suggest 
that researchers move beyond studies at the national level to include cross-cultural 
comparisons, which may be essential to understanding how different news regimes 
might affect public opinion. Given the general differences in attitudes toward science 
and technology between Europe and United States—and toward nanotechnology in 
specific (Gaskell et al., 2005)—this approach offers potential for future studies that 
might compare differences in media coverage of nanotechnology across cultures. 
Attempts to further synthesize this “fractured paradigm” abound, and much of 
the recent focus has been on the issue of biotechnology. In analyzing the heated debate 
about biotechnology in Switzerland, Dahinden (2002) suggests that frame theory is a 
promising approach for better understanding science communication because frames 
are relevant on all levels and in all phases of mass communication processes, 
including journalist routines, media content, public attitudes, and even public relations 
activities. Entman’s definition of a frame is too narrow, Dahinden says, preferring to 
identify frames on the above levels as well as the level of the general culture, as 
traditional narratives and myths that also are relevant for modern societies. With 
Gamson, Dahinden finds that most frames are not issue-specific, but of a more general 
nature. 
Bonfadelli (2005) suggests that the most important effect of mass media may 
lie in their ability to structure and organize the world for audiences. People form 
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judgments and opinions about issues based on “cognitive structures” planted over time 
by the media through selection, emphasis, and framing. Since biotechnology is a 
complex issue that people have little personal experience with, the media’s portrayal 
of the topic should have a strong influence on how they perceive biotechnology, 
Bonfadelli asserts. In examining the knowledge gap hypothesis as it relates to 
biotechnology in Europe, he found that education levels and media input are both 
important factors in determining attitudes toward biotechnology, and that these factors 
operate on the country level, not just on the individual level. His study showed that 
people in countries with high levels of education and with intensive communication 
among groups and through the mass media are more knowledgeable about 
biotechnology than people in countries with lower levels of education and 
communication. 
Priest’s (2006) study of gene technologies in the public sphere illustrates the 
complex relationship between public opinion and media coverage. In seeking to 
explain the apparent resonance between the climate of opinion and media frames in 
different regions of Canada and the United States, she suggests that the dynamics of 
collective attitudes and behavior are not reducible to individual-level attitudes or 
cognition, but depend on both culture and social structure (p. 57). Priest rejects both 
the reduction of opinion to a characteristic of individual psychology and the reduction 
of risk debates to stand-offs between scientific experts and a “lay public,” preferring to 
find a middle ground based partly in cultural theory. Within particular societies, sub-
cultural groups exist that have shared values and beliefs, forming a climate of opinion 
that lends expression to collective views. Her results indicate that “the differences 
between the United States and Canada in terms of public opinion regarding particular 
genetic technologies may be best understood in terms of identifiable attitudinal 
clusters with distinct geographic distributions” (p. 70). These clusters resonate with 
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the available media data, which show that while reporters have the opportunity to 
make dissent visible and enable informed public debate, they instead depend primarily 
on visible events and vocal spokespersons, making it difficult to realize their potential 
to contribute to healthy democratic society. 
With an eye toward integrating the vast literature from communication 
researchers, political scientists, and sociologists, Nisbet and Huge (2006) have sought 
to synthesize these common threads into one overarching theory linking press 
coverage to public opinion and the policy process—what they call “a model of 
mediated issue development.” Seeking generalizability across a variety of scientific 
and technological issues, Nisbet begins with stem cell research (Nisbet et al., 2003; 
Nisbet, 2005), then turns his attention to plant biotechnology, intelligent design, and 
the Human Genome Project. The model conceptualizes several important underlying 
social mechanisms that drive cycles of media attention and definition to policy issues, 
highlighting as underlying mechanisms (1) the type of policy venue where debate 
takes place or is centered, (2) the media lobbying activities of competing strategic 
actors as they attempt to interpret or “frame” the issue advantageously, (3) the 
tendency for different types of journalists to depend heavily on shared news values 
and norms to narrate the policy world, and (4) the context relative to other competing 
issues (Nisbet & Huge, 2006, p. 7). 
Stem cell research and plant biotechnology offer an opportune comparison. For 
both issues, discussions initially began in administrative policy contexts, where 
scientists and technical arguments held the most weight. Media coverage during this 
phase was scant, with stories only appearing occasionally by science reporters. Also 
for both issues, certain “framing events” caused media coverage to rise, but here is 
where the similarities end. Stem cell research has become a “celebrity issue,” ever 
since President George W. Bush announced that he would limit federal funding for 
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embryonic stem cell research in 2001. But despite several seemingly important 
controversies related to plant biotechnology, including the Starlink and Monarch 
Butterfly incidents, this issue has not grabbed the media spotlight, much to the 
consternation of activists who oppose this technology. Despite attempts to shift the 
debate toward more dramatic frames by various opposition groups, media discourse in 
the United States around plant biotechnology has remained predominantly technical. 
Because the issue has remained within administrative arenas, and because the issue 
has remained defined in technical and scientific terms, it is likely that journalists have 
been unable to place plant biotechnology into a larger narrative structure, giving 
greater meaning to passing events, which might lead to an increase in coverage of the 
issue (p. 32). Stem cell research, on the other hand, was catapulted from the 
administrative policy arena to the overtly political arena after President Bush’s 
announcement, which caused a shift in reporting from scientific reporters to political 
and general assignment reporters, and a corresponding increase in media coverage. 
The model of mediated issue development also attempts to link these media 
issue cycles with public opinion. While a central assumption of scientists and science 
enthusiasts throughout the years has been that increasing public understanding of an 
issue via the media will automatically lead to increased public support for research, 
Nisbet (2005) suggests that people are essentially “cognitive misers,” relying primarily 
on their existing value predispositions and only the information most readily available 
to them from the mass media to formulate opinions about complex technical policy 
issues. For the issue of stem cell research, Nisbet found that religious values moderate 
the influence of a person’s awareness on their support for an issue, further 
complicating the perceived deficit model that many scientists still operate under. For 
highly religious people, an increase in awareness and understanding of stem cell 
research does not translate into more support, presumably because they are relying on 
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religious predispositions more heavily than information, according to Nisbet. 
However, for individuals who are non-religious or moderately religious, the more they 
see, read, or hear about stem cell research, the more likely they are to call upon 
positive considerations when forming an opinion about the subject, especially given 
the generally positive media coverage of the issue. 
 
Overview 
This thesis attempts to apply various aspects of these foregoing theories to the 
public discourse surrounding nanotechnology, with the goal of attaining a better 
understanding of the complex interactions among media coverage, public opinion, and 
policy debates about emerging technologies. While nanotechnology is new to the 
public agenda, several things are already clear: The few public opinion surveys that 
have been performed to date show that public awareness and knowledge of 
nanotechnology is very low. Public attitudes toward the development of 
nanotechnology, on the other hand, are generally positive. Media coverage in the early 
years was sparse, but the attention paid to nanotechnology by reporters was usually 
positive. The following two sections will examine media coverage (Chapter 2) and 
public attitudes (Chapter 3) about nanotechnology more closely, while attempting to 




THE SALIENCE OF SMALL  
Content Analysis of Media Coverage 
The goal of this part of the study is simply to describe media coverage of 
nanotechnology, but with an eye toward trying to understand the issue-attention cycles 
of nanotechnology and other emerging technologies, and to eventually uncover the 
social mechanisms that are behind these cycles. More broadly, the goal is also to see if 
media coverage and public opinion surrounding emerging technologies follows a 
characteristic pattern. According to Hilgartner and Lewenstein (2004), “Much work 
needs to be done to systematically map the contours, dynamics, and topology of the 
social, political, and technical features that constitute the speculative space of 
‘emerging technologies’” (p. 6). 
Several others have studied examples of emerging technologies in the public 
sphere, most notably related to nuclear power and biotechnology (Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1989; Gaskell & Bauer, 2001; Nisbet & Lewenstein, 2002; Ten Eyck & 
Williment, 2003; McInerny et al., 2004). Gamson and Modigliani analyzed discourse 
on nuclear power from 1945 to1989 in four general audience media: television news 
coverage, newsmagazine accounts, editorial cartoons, and syndicated opinion 
columns. When the discourse was compared with public opinion surveys, they found 
that public opinion about nuclear power could only be understood by rooting it in an 
issue culture that was both reflected and shaped by the media. This classic study 
formed the basis for several research projects analyzing media discourse and public 
opinion on biotechnology in the latter part of the 20th century. 
The most obvious comparison for the current study is Nisbet and Lewenstein’s 
analysis of biotechnology in the American elite press from 1970 to 1999. They found 
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that media attention in the New York Times and Newsweek steadily increased across 
the 1980s and most of the 1990s, although it was significantly event-driven, peaking 
and plummeting in response to major occurrences in the scientific realm. The tone of 
this coverage was consistently positive, with overwhelming emphasis on the frames of 
scientific progress and economic prospect. 
Nisbet and Lewenstein chose to base their biotechnology study on a set of 
narrowly defined research questions rather than hypothesizing specific media trends, 
because of the limited availability of previous quantitative research characterizing the 
nature of media coverage of biotechnology. But since nanotechnology may follow a 
similar trajectory as biotechnology and other emerging technologies, this should offer 
a basis for hypothesizing. The general hypothesis guiding this study is that media 
coverage and public opinion surrounding emerging technologies follows a regular 
pattern, and specifically that media coverage of nanotechnology will follow the same 
basic trajectory, in terms of salience and framing, as did biotechnology before it. More 
specifically, the following hypotheses are presented:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Coverage will start out very low and then rise steadily when triggered 
by certain “framing events” in the scientific and public spheres. 
Hypothesis 2: In the early stages of development, coverage will be overwhelmingly 
positive, with most stories focusing on progress and economic prospects. 
Hypothesis 3: As time passes and nanotechnology seeps into the public consciousness, 
coverage will spread from elite media outlets to more general media outlets. 
 
Methods 
To assess the place of nanotechnology in the media, a content analysis was 
conducted of three “elite” media outlets (New York Times, Washington Post, Wall 
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Street Journal) and one general media outlet (Associated Press) for the period 1 
January 1986 to 30 June 2004. The first year of the study was chosen as 1986 because 
it is often considered the beginning of the “canonical history” of nanotechnology—
when Eric Drexler published his landmark book Engines of Creation, which laid out 
his vision of the revolutionary potential of molecular manufacturing. The final sample 
contained about 620 relevant articles, drawn from a pool of all articles that contained 
the words “nanotechnology” or “nanoscience” in the Lexis-Nexis online database (for 
the New York Times and the Associated Press) or the Factiva online database (for the 
Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal). The coding sheet was based on the 
coding sheet used in Nisbet and Lewenstein (2002), with changes made after 
exploratory coding. After training resulting in intercoder reliability of more than 75% 
for all items, coding was performed in waves by two graduate students and one 
undergraduate.  
Elite media outlets were included because coverage in opinion-leading 
publications like these is likely to represent the prevailing tone of coverage in the 
United States. As Gitlin (1980) has observed, stories tend to spread vertically within 
the news hierarchy, with editors at regional news outlets often deferring to elite 
newspapers and newswires to set the national news agenda. These papers also set the 
science agenda because they often have much larger and more experienced science 
reporting staffs. And since nanotechnology is a science-related issue in its early stages 
of development, discourse is still most likely to take place among various elites. 
Studies have shown that, traditionally, leaders in America—whatever their specific 
discipline—focus their attention mainly on the New York Times, the Wall Street 
Journal, and the Washington Post (Weiss, 1974). Although the balance among these 
particular publications and newer media like all-news channels and the Web has 
changed in recent years, no clear analyses have emerged. 
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The Associated Press was also chosen to include a more general media outlet 
in the study, and print was chosen over television or radio because it is more amenable 
to content analysis, but also because there is some evidence that print media set the 
agenda for other types of news outlets (Lopez-Escobar et al., 1998; Roberts & 
McCombs, 1994). 
The analytical approach laid out by Gamson and Modigliani (1989) and refined 
by Gaskell and Bauer (2001) and Nisbet and Lewenstein (2002) was adapted for this 
study, with some slight modifications. Using a well-tested scheme such as this 
provides an extra measure of reliability in the research design process. The approach, 
which allows for measurement of both relatively manifest article content as well as 
more latent and interpretive content, involves identifying key “themes” in the media 
coverage, as well as “frames” in the articles. The theme of the story is simply its topic, 
and a story can have more than one. Measuring themes provides an indicator of the 
type of nanotechnology research presented in the article, or the related economic, 
political, or social developments featured by journalists. Coders could choose from 
five themes: “applications” (proposed and actual uses of nanotechnology); “policy” 
(current legislation); “politics” (bipartisan support/disagreement, federal monies 
issues); “financial” (investment reports, economic opportunities); and “safety or 
risks.” An “other” category was available for the coder to write in a different theme 
not articulated in this list. The coder could choose more than one theme per article, 
assessed on a four-point scale including “not present,” “briefly mentioned,” “present,” 
and “dominant.” 
At first glance, the notion of “frame” differs only subtly from “theme,” but it is 
an important distinction. The concept of a frame plays on the image of a picture that is 
defined at the edges, putting a drawing or a photograph into a defined context. The 
meaning of the picture depends on the context that is opened up by the frame. By 
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analogy, a news story on a certain theme is presented within a particular frame of 
discourse that puts the topic in a particular light and perspective (Gaskell & Bauer 
2001, p. 40). These media frames offer a central organizing idea or story line that 
provide meaning to an unfolding series of events, suggesting what the controversy is 
about, and the essence of an issue (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). When an issue does 
appear in the media, if interests can define their stand as well as the alternatives 
available for discussion, then they have “framed” the situation in more winnable 
terms, restricting the arguments the opposition can make and shutting them off from 
participation (Berkowitz, 1992). Frames also serve as working routines for journalists 
that allow journalists to quickly identify and classify information, packaging it for 
audiences. These organizing devices are especially useful when journalists find 
themselves in unfamiliar territory. 
Table 1 presents the framing typology for nanotechnology coverage, broken 
down into eight categories (with a ninth option for the coder to insert “other”). Some 
frames are inherently more positive, such as “progress” and “economic prospects,” 
while others like “Pandora’s Box” and “runaway” are generally negative. But a frame 
is meant to be an organizing idea, not necessarily a positive or negative assessment. 
For example, “economic prospects” can also be negative if the article predicts negative 
effects on the economy from nanotechnology. The issue is still framed as primarily an 
economic one, suggesting that the economic side of nanotechnology is the most 
important—regardless of a positive or negative effect. Likewise, a story emphasizing 
the “public accountability” frame could present negative aspects, such as a lack of 
proper concern for public issues by the certain members of the scientific community. 













Progress: report of technical development; nanotechnology represents the “wave of 
the future.” 
 
Economic Prospects: nanotechnology’s effect on the economy. 
 
Ethical: nanotechnology is either morally necessary or morally repugnant. 
 
Pandora’s Box: developing nanotechnology will create unforeseen ills. 
 
Runaway: nanotechnology may spiral out of human control. 
 
Public Accountability: coverage about ethical, legal, and societal implications; 
influence over research and development. 
 
Long Way Away: applications from nanotechnology will be in the distant future. 
 
Confluence: nanotechnology represents a confluence of technologies including 
biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science. 
 
 
NOTE: Framing typology is adapted from Nisbet & Lewenstein (2002) and 
Durant, Bauer, and Gaskell (1998), and was originally developed in part by Gamson & 
Modigliani (1989). 
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public in developing nanotechnology. In either case, the story is demonstrating that 
societal concerns are a particularly salient aspect of nanotechnology. 
Two of the frames that were originally associated with biotechnology—
globalization and nature/nurture—are not especially pertinent to nanotechnology and 
did not appear in preliminary readings, so they were excluded from the coding. 
Likewise, a preliminary analysis revealed two new frames: the idea that applications 
of nanotechnology will not appear for years into the future (“They’re a long way 
away”), and the idea that that nanotechnology is part of a confluence of emerging 
technologies including biotechnology and artificial intelligence. The coding sheet also 
included questions about whether an article presented positive and/or negative aspects 
of nanotechnology. Rather than addressing this as an either/or option, the coders were 
allowed to note if an article presented both positive and negative aspects, and to what 
degree (a three-point scale for positive and negative, including “none,” “some,” and 
“many or strongly”). 
 
Results 
Since nanotechnology is still in the very early stages of issue development, this 
is necessarily a preliminary study, and only descriptive observations of the data are 
presented. The goal is simply to begin to understand both the amount of coverage and 
the tone of coverage. The basic trajectory of coverage shows that media attention to 
nanotechnology began in 1998, rising quickly from just a few articles a year to more 
than 150 in 2003 (Figure 1: The apparent dip in 2004 is an artifact of having data for 
only half the year; the total will probably far surpass the 2003 total). This trajectory 









Figure 1. Total number of articles about nanotechnology in the New York Times, Wall 
Street Journal, Washington Post, and Associated Press, 1986-2004. (Dotted line 
























































































Using data from Nisbet and Lewenstein (2002), a comparison was made 
between coverage of biotechnology in the New York Times and nanotechnology 
coverage in the same newspaper. (The New York Times was the only common 
publication between the two studies.) Year 1 for biotechnology corresponds to 1970; 
for nanotechnology, year 1 is 1986. The comparison is somewhat artificial, since these 
are just the starting dates for both content analyses, but it showed that the amount of 
coverage in the early years is very similar for both emerging technologies. A 
somewhat more meaningful comparison emerges when the dates are shifted so that the 
first spike in coverage for both issues occurs at the same time, which corresponds to 
1977 for biotechnology and 1995 for nanotechnology. The first spike engendered 
almost exactly the same number of articles for both technologies in the New York 
Times. For biotechnology, 1977 is the year when Congress held hearings and 
introduced legislation related to recombinant DNA. No clear framing event emerges in 
the media coverage of nanotechnology in 1995, except perhaps the release of a book 
by Ed Regis called Nano: The Emerging Science of Nanotechnology. The comparison 
also showed that nanotechnology coverage has reached the same level of coverage in 
2004 as biotechnology coverage did at about this time—16 years into the study. The 
first major spike in biotechnology coverage occurred in 1980, producing almost 40 
articles on the subject in the New York Times. 1980 marked the beginning of the 
“biotechnology boom,” as industrial development of biotechnology began to take off. 
Nanotechnology’s first major spike occurs a little later in 2000, producing about 25 
articles. This was the year when Bill Joy’s article appeared in Wired, but 2000 also 
saw a number of advances in nanotechnology that were covered by the New York 
Times science writing staff—from the first bacteria-size machine to a tiny “camera in a 
pill.” Since events in the scientific realm and the public sphere rarely (if ever) follow a 
predictable pattern, there is no reason to expect that nanotechnology will follow the 
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same exact cycle as biotechnology. But taken together, these data suggest that 
nanotechnology coverage is event-driven, rather than issue-driven. 
Across each of the four publications, coverage has generally increased steadily 
over time (Figure 2). Two main exceptions occur: The number of articles in the New 
York Times seems low for 2004, while Associated Press coverage does not really 
appear until 2000 and then rises very quickly in 2003 and 2004, far surpassing the 
other publications. (Since data was only available for the first half of 2004, it has been 
doubled for this graph to illustrate the projected value for the full year.) The 
explanation for the lower number of New York Times articles is unclear. The large 
jump in Associated Press coverage, however, seems to indicate that interest in 
nanotechnology is spreading to a wider public beyond the audience of the elite press. 
Figure 3 details the total number of positive assessments and negative 
assessments across four time periods, including stories that were coded as presenting 
“some” positive aspect or “many” positive aspects (and likewise for negative 
assessments). Coverage throughout the entire period is overwhelmingly positive. 
Figures 4 and 5 show the number of stories exhibiting positive and negative 
assessments by theme. Articles about applications and finance dominate the coverage, 
and, as would be expected, these tend to be more positive in tone. Articles about risks 
associated with nanotechnology are clearly negative in tone, but such articles are only 
a small part of the overall mix. The key observation from these data is that positive 
stories tend to be much more strongly positive than the negative stories are negative. 
For each theme, the “some” and “strongly” positive assessments dominate, with only a 
few stories containing no positive emphasis. On the other hand, the vast majority of 
stories contain no negative assessment at all. Those that do tend to only have “some” 
negative aspects as opposed to being “strongly” negative. This demonstrates further 









Figure 2. Number of articles by publication beginning in 1995 and including the 
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roughly parallel the positive and negative assessments of biotechnology seen in earlier 
coverage. 
Irrespective of the year, the vast majority of articles tend to frame 
nanotechnology in terms of progress and economic prospects (Table 2: The frames 
have been weighted to a percentage scale based only on the dominant frame in each 
story. More than one frame could actually appear in a given story). The “public 
accountability” frame arises fairly early and remains present throughout. “Long way 
away” appears in 2000 and 2001, but then does not show up again as a dominant 
frame. At the same time, economic frames have become a steadily larger part of the 
media picture, making up almost as large a percentage of the overall mix as progress 
frames in 2004, which may suggest that as researchers continually present more 
findings based on nanotechnology and as products make their way to market, these 
technologies do not seem as far away as they once did. Interestingly, “runaway” and 
“Pandora’s Box” do not appear until 2002 and 2003, corresponding with the release of 
Michael Crichton’s Prey in 2002 and the ETC Group’s report in early 2003, which 
both focused on the uncontrollable nature of nanotechnology. These frames were not 
dominant in any stories during the first part of 2004, which would suggest that the 
effect of these publications might be dissipating. This would further support the notion 
that nanotechnology coverage is event-driven. 
Figures 6 and 7 show the number of stories exhibiting positive and negative 
assessments by frame. As with the themes, articles about applications and finance 
dominate the coverage, and are much more positive in tone. Negative assessments 
show up significantly only with “runaway” and “Pandora’s Box,” as would be 
expected. But as Figure 6 demonstrates, these can also be framed in a positive manner. 




















Dominant Frame 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Progress 84 46 77 65 60 63 
Economic Prospects 11 6 13 14 16 26 
Ethical 0 4 3 0 1 0 
Pandora’s Box 0 13 0 9 8 9 
Runaway 0 13 0 4 4 0 
Public Account. 5 9 3 3 8 2 
Long Way Away 0 7 3 1 0 0 























































suggesting a media perception of nanotechnology as a distinctive new source of 
progress. 
Figure 8 plots the percentage of articles in the New York Times with a given 
frame for nanotechnology and for the first 20 years of the biotechnology data. (Since 
the nanotechnology framing data are based on a three-level ordinal measurement, the 
bars represent the percentage of articles that include a frame as either “present” or 
“dominant.”) Both technologies are framed in terms of progress, but this frame is more 
dominant in biotechnology coverage, and the other more “negative” frames barely 
appear at all. Yet the nanotechnology stories include “Pandora’s Box,” “runaway,” 
and “public accountability” as a significant percentage. The explanation for this 
phenomenon is not clear, but perhaps the experience with biotechnology has caused 
journalists to be a little more skeptical about nanotechnology from the outset. 
The format of news stories across each year also was examined, guided by the 
theory from Nisbet et al. (2003) that media attention to a scientific issue should peak 
when the issue can be easily dramatized, which may correspond to a shift from 
administrative contexts to overtly political arenas. Such a shift in issue definition often 
entails a shift in which type of journalist will cover a story, with a move from writers 
on the science beat to more general-assignment and political reporters. No definitive 
pattern emerges from the data, but there is certainly a shift of some sort. In 1999, 44% 
of the articles were from newspaper Science Desks, while only 19% came from News 
Desks or in the form of News Briefs. In 2003, only 10% of the stories came from 
Science Desks, yet 48% came from News Desks and News Briefs. The ratio shifts 











Figure 8. Percentage of stories by frame for biotechnology and nanotechnology in the 









 Spearman’s Rho correlations were run among all themes and frames to 
examine potential unexpected correlations. Unlike the Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient does not require the 
assumption that the relationship between the variables is linear, nor does it require the 
variables to be measured on interval scales; it can be used for variables measured at 
the ordinal level. Correlations among individual frames produced the most interesting 
results, which are presented in Table 3. “Pandora’s box” and “runaway” appear to be 
very strongly correlated (.632, significant at the .01 level). These two frames would be 
expected to appear together frequently, given their similarity. But this also suggests 
that perhaps the frames are too similar, and the coders may have had difficulty 
distinguishing between them. In future studies, it might make sense to collapse the two 
frames into a single variable.  
The “long way away” frame is strongly correlated in a positive direction with 
five other frames: “progress”, “ethical”, “Pandora’s box”, “runaway”, and 
“confluence”. It is not surprising that “long way away” would be correlated with 
frames of a positive nature, since exploratory coding indicated that this frame was tied 
to an expectation that the benefits of nanotechnology are still a long way in the future. 
However, perhaps its correlation with “ethical”, “Pandora’s box”, and “runaway” 
suggest that the concerns about nanotechnology presented in news coverage are 
tempered by the same expectation: If the applications of nanotechnology are a long 
way away, then the risks that may arise are also too far in the future to raise concern. 
This is further supported by data presented in Figures 6 and 7, which show the number 
of positive and negative assessments broken down by frame. The “long way away” 
frame appears in an overwhelmingly positive light, despite its strong correlation with 














Table 3.  Spearman’s Rho correlations among frames. 
 
 
 Prog Econ Ethic Pand Run Pub Long Conf Oth 
Progress 1.000 .035 -.009 -.169** -.123** -.095* .253** .091* .099* 
Economic .035 1.000 -.034 -.100* -.094* .011 -.076 -.022 -.064 
Ethical -.009 -.034 1.000 .346** .282** .140** .115** .021 .102* 
Pandora -.169** -.100* .346** 1.000 .632** .146** .129** -.021 .153** 
Runaway -.123** -.094* .282** .632** 1.000 .078 .184** .009 .129** 
Public -.095* .011 .140** .146** .078 1.000 .013 -.037 .022 
Long .253** -.076 .115** .129** .184** .013 1.000 .125** .198** 
Conf .091* -.022 .021 -.021 .009 -.037 .125** 1.000 .218** 
Other .099* -.064 .102* .153** .129** .022 .198** .218** 1.000 
 
* = Correlation is significant at the .05 level 




Hypothesis 1 was confirmed, with nanotechnology coverage frequency starting 
out very low until the late 1990s when the number of articles took a dramatic leap. 
What were the events that spurred this rise in coverage? Further research should 
examine this connection more rigorously, but the anecdotal evidence suggests that 
popularized accounts like Bill Joy’s article in Wired and Michael Crichton’s Prey may 
have had a dramatic effect on the amount of coverage, but not on the tone of coverage. 
Journalists seemed to focus more on the revolutionary potential of nanotechnology as 
a force for economic and technological progress. The so-called “Prey effect,” 
however, may not have played much of a part in the coverage at all. Prior to analyzing 
the data, it was suspected that Prey might cause a bump in coverage that would 
eventually die down in 2003 and 2004, but this does not appear to have been the case. 
The number of articles about nanotechnology continues to rise rapidly. 
The data also support Hypothesis 2. The coverage of nanotechnology is 
overwhelmingly positive in general; and even when stories are negative, they are not 
strongly negative. Much has been written about the “shared culture” between scientists 
and journalists, which often leads to media coverage of science that is highly colored 
by a scientific viewpoint. Given that the supporters and promoters of nanotechnology 
have been characterized by a heavy focus on marketable applications and economic 
development, could it be that this shared culture has made journalists “complicit” in 
perpetuating this vision of nanotechnology? It is important to note, however, that the 
coverage of nanotechnology is not quite as overwhelmingly positive as biotechnology 
was in its first 20 years. With biotechnology, the more negative frames barely appear 
during this period, while the coverage of nanotechnology includes them at a more 
significant level. Further studies should examine the reason for this difference: Is it an 
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inherent aspect of nanotechnology as an issue? Or is it an effect of the current climate 
in the United States and around the world—partly influenced by biotechnology 
controversies—where people are more inclined to pay attention to risks, whether they 
come from terrorism or technology? 
Hypothesis 3 is also supported, as the number of stories about nanotechnology 
in the Associated Press has increased rapidly and even eclipsed all of the other elite 
media outlets. This tentatively suggests that the issue is becoming more salient to the 
general public, but questions remain. Are the journalists at the Associated Press just 
following the lead of the elite media? Or are they reflecting a growing interest by the 
general public in nano-related issues? These and other questions should be addressed 
in future studies. 
One other interesting bit of information came out of the study. The “public 
accountability” frame appears surprisingly early in nanotechnology coverage and 
remains a significant element throughout. This frame appears more often than the 
“runaway frame” and on a par with the “Pandora’s Box” frame—both of which 
encompass the scary “sci-fi” scenarios that nanotechnology could engender. This 
suggests that the media may be reflecting what risk communication scholars have 
known for years: what really worries people are not scary “sci-fi” scenarios, but rather 
questions of trust and credibility, especially regarding public officials and 
multinational corporations. Public uncertainties are rarely focused on the state of the 
science, but on whom to trust (Friedman et al.,1999; Irwin & Wynne, 1996). Gaskell 
and Bauer (2001), for example, showed that arguments against GM food in Britain 
were pushed largely by the collapse of trust in the U.K. regulatory system after the 
poor handling of the “mad cow” scare. 
From the perspective of many scientists, the attitude surrounding new 
technologies should follow a “diffusion of innovation” approach, which first assumes 
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that the technology is good, and then uses social science research to find ways to 
speed up public acceptance. But Gregory and Miller (1998) advise that scientists 
should focus more on cultivating trust, and less on cultivating “understanding” or 
“acceptance.” No amount of information will create favorable public opinion unless 
social contexts are addressed, and in issues that involve great uncertainty, science 
“literacy” is beside the point, they suggest. In this tradition of thought, Irwin and 
Wynne (1996) suggest that the public’s view of risk is less naïve than scientists 
believe, and in fact the public often knows more about science than science knows 
about the public. The problem with risk communication, then, is not the public’s 





THE (TINY) PICTURES IN OUR HEADS  
Public Opinion Survey 
Clearly, content analysis research needs to be coupled with studies of public 
opinion in order to understand the linkages between the public presence of information 
and the actual public debate that occurs. Three recent public opinion studies (Royal 
Academy, 2004; Cobb & Macoubrie, 2004; Scheufele & Lewenstein, 2005) reveal 
some common themes: In general, people have heard little (if anything) about 
nanotechnology, and they know even less about it—whether on a self-assessed basis 
or on a miniature “test” administered as part of the survey. Yet despite this lack of 
knowledge, the overwhelming majority of people view nanotechnology in a positive 
light, saying that they think the benefits will outweigh the risks. 
To add another level of data to these studies, this survey offers an early 
glimpse into public attitudes about the potential applications of nanotechnology in 
agriculture and food production in New York state. While the data were limited to one 
state, providing less of a basis for generalization when compared to national surveys, 
the results do address an important specific issue that is near to respondents’ hearts. 
Nanotechnology as it is applied to new materials and manufacturing methods can 
seem distant from a person’s everyday experience, but the techniques that lead to 
putting food on the table would seemingly be of more vital interest. And these 
questions bring nanotechnology closer to a key part of the biotechnology debate that 
has been studied so thoroughly—plant biotechnology and genetically modified foods. 
The study was guided by the following broad research questions, meant to 




Research Question 1: What is the level of awareness of nanotechnology among the 
general public in New York state? 
Research Question 2: How do people in New York state perceive the relative risks and 
benefits of nanotechnology? 
Research Question 3: What are the levels of support and opposition in New York state 
to the application of nanotechnology to agriculture and food production? 
 
Methods 
Telephone data were collected from February to March of 2005 from a 
randomly generated sample of New York residents (N=800). Three questions were 
included about nanotechnology. (The first question was also included on the 2004 poll 
to give a basis for comparison, while the other two are new.) 
Question 1: Nanotechnology works at the molecular level, atom by atom, to 
build structures, materials, and machines. On a scale from one to 10, with one 
being NOT MUCH AT ALL and 10 being A GREAT DEAL, would you tell 
me how much you have heard or read about nanotechnology? 
Question 2: People have frequently noted that new technologies have produced 
both benefits and risks. Do you think the benefits of nanotechnology will 
outweigh the risks, or the risks will outweigh the benefits, or the risks and 
benefits will be about equal? 
1. BENEFITS WILL OUTWEIGH THE RISKS 
2. RISKS WILL OUTWEIGH THE BENEFITS 
3. RISKS AND BENEFITS WILL BE ABOUT EQUAL 
Question 3: Overall, would you say you oppose or support the use of 
nanotechnology in agriculture and food production? Let’s use a 10-point scale 
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For question 1, 43% of respondents said they had heard “not much at all” about 
nanotechnology, and about 5% said they had heard “a great deal.” These findings are 
almost exactly the same as those from the previous year’s survey, suggesting what 
every other survey to date has pointed out: that nanotechnology is still not on most 
people’s radar screens. However, the mean response in the previous year was 3.3 (SD 
2.7), while in this survey the mean response rose to 4.2 (SD 2.9), which indicates that 
perhaps people are somewhat more aware of nanotechnology on average. 
 Of the people who were willing to provide a response to question 2, 33.2% 
said “benefits will outweigh the risks”; 14.9% said “risks will outweigh the benefits”; 
and 52.0% said “risks and benefits will be about equal” (mean: 2.19; SD: 0.9). This 
also is fairly consistent with findings from other studies, particularly in United States. 
However, it should be noted that 29.3% of all the respondents said “do not know,” 
indicating at first blush that a large chunk of people would not make an assessment 
about a technology that was unfamiliar to them. Still, considering the very low 
awareness among the respondents indicated in question 1, it seems that quite a few 
people (more than 70%) are still willing to make assessments about nanotechnology. 
This should come as no surprise, given the previous discussion of theories about how 
people make decisions based on little or no knowledge—as “cognitive misers” who 
use existing predispositions to mediate information received from the media and other 
outside sources. 
 Of those willing to make an assessment in question 3, 19.6% said they 
“strongly oppose” the use of nanotechnology in agriculture and food production, and 
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10.9% said they “strongly support” it. 23.4% of respondents said they “do not know,” 
and the mean response was right down the middle at 5.17 (SD: 2.827). In this case, the 
opposition to nanotechnology is fairly high when compared to other studies, perhaps 
because the question is geared toward applications in agriculture and food production, 
which directly affect what people eat. The question wording may also call to mind 
other recent issue such as the debate about genetically modified organisms. Other 
studies that have focused on more standard commercial applications, such as new 
materials, have seen higher levels of support. 
 Pearson correlations were run between question 1 (“heard about 
nanotechnology”) and the controlling variables, yielding the following correlations 
that are all significant at the .01 level: 
.153 (Attended a community forum or public meeting in the past 12 months) 
.239 (Household income level) 
.240 (Education level) 
-.100 (Liberal/conservative on social issues—negative number means that 
liberals are more likely to have heard about nanotechnology) 
 Pearson correlations also were run between the other continuous variable, 
question 3 (“support nanotechnology in agriculture and food production”), question 1, 
and the controlling variables, yielding these results that are significant at the .01 level: 
.274 (Heard about nanotechnology) 
.229 (Household income level) 
.177 (Education level) 
 
Discussion 
In general, the results are fairly intuitive. How much one has heard about 
nanotechnology correlates strongly with being politically liberal and being more 
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engaged in the political process. That is, the type of person who would attend a public 
meeting is also the type of person who is more likely to be informed about a 
seemingly abstract scientific issue like nanotechnology. This raises an interesting 
question: Is this type of person simply exposed to a greater amount of media coverage, 
or do they seek information more actively than others? Such a question goes beyond 
the scope of this study, but it could be a good topic for further research into the ways 
that people engage in public deliberation. 
Support for nanotechnology significantly correlates with higher levels of 
education and family income, as well as how much a respondent had heard about 
nanotechnology. This suggests that nanotechnology is only something more “elite” 
people are paying attention to, which corresponds well with the media content analysis 
in the previous section. Thus far, only the more “elite” media outlets are paying any 
sort of significant attention to nanotechnology, although this does seem to be 
changing. The content analysis showed that coverage in the Associated Press has 
spiked dramatically in recent years, which indicates that interest in nanotechnology is 
spreading to a wider public beyond the audience of the elite press. Likewise, the 
survey findings also show a small increase in general awareness of nanotechnology 
over the previous year, which corroborates this finding from the media analysis. 
Support for nanotechnology also correlates strongly with how much one has 
heard about nanotechnology. On the face of it, this seems fairly obvious. It has long 
been accepted wisdom that the way to create greater support for science and 
technology is by simply increasing awareness among the general public. But this 
accepted wisdom has been called into question by a number of scholars in recent 
years. For example, one view might hold that people simply lump nanotechnology into 
the general category of “science and technology”—a category that most in the United 
States tend to support, saying the potential benefits outweigh the risks (National 
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Science Board, 2004, p. 7-23). A survey by Gaskell et al. (2005), however, reveals that 
attitudes toward nanotechnology are different in Europe and the United States. They 
suggest that people in the United States assimilate nanotechnology within a set of pro-
technology cultural values, while Europeans tend to have more concern about the 
impact of technology on the environment, less commitment to economic progress, and 
less confidence in regulation. They also note that European media coverage of 
nanotechnology is less overwhelmingly positive than in the United States, which 
mirrors public attitudes at the moment. 
Perhaps the most striking result from the current survey is that more than half 
of all respondents were ambivalent about their position, suggesting that people in New 
York State are not quite sure what to make of this emerging technology. This 
correlates strongly with what researchers have found in the many surveys of attitudes 
toward plant biotechnology in the United States. Despite what seems to be a topic that 
should generate significant strong feelings and a great deal of media coverage, the 
debate over plant biotechnology and genetically modified foods has yet to heat up in 
the United States, although it has definitely taken off in Europe, as Nisbet and Huge 
(2006) have discussed. 
Cobb and Macoubrie (2004) point out an interesting trend from their study: 
Being exposed to Michael Crichton’s Prey significantly affects respondents’ 
perceptions of risks versus benefits, but not in the expected direction. “A whopping 
63% predicted that benefits of nanotechnology would exceed the risks if they were 
exposed to Prey, compared to just 38% if they weren’t exposed to it” (p. 11). It has 
been suggested that this effect stems from the fact that most people who read science 
fiction books like Prey already have a positive view of science and technology, 
although Cobb and Macoubrie say this can be ruled out because there are hundreds 
more respondents who like science fiction but have not been exposed to Prey. Another 
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possible explanation is that humanity eventually triumphs at the end of the book, 








The current study is just a preliminary analysis, but the data point to a similar 
pattern of media coverage for biotechnology and for nanotechnology—in terms of 
both salience and framing. There is, of course, no reason to expect that coverage of the 
two issues will be exactly the same, but perhaps some of the lessons from 
biotechnology can be applied to nanotechnology, while also providing a foundation to 
begin understanding a new and distinct theoretical category: “emerging technologies.” 
To understand media coverage of science and its effects more fully, we need, as David 
Edge suggests, “a more detailed understanding not only of the topography of the 
public’s image of science but also of how (and to what extent) that image can be 
manipulated by those in whose interest it is to do so” (Edge, 1995). To examine what 
shapes media coverage of an emerging technology, further studies could attempt to 
correlate specific events with peaks in coverage and shifts in tone, while also 
examining the “agenda-building” activities of various actors in the public sphere, such 
as press releases. Several studies of this nature have already been conducted for 
biotechnology-related issues (Nisbet & Lewenstein, 2002; Ten Eyck & Williment, 
2003; McInerny et al., 2004; Nisbet et al., 2003). 
Once an issue is framed by the media, it can be very difficult for actors in the 
public sphere to shift the image to another perspective. This was clearly illustrated in 
the debates over nuclear power and genetically modified food. Yet the preliminary 
public opinion data about nanotechnology, coupled with anecdotal evidence, suggests 
that the framing for nanotechnology is yet to be established. Why should this be? 
Narrative and conflict seem to be important factors. As Thurs (2005) has noted in his 
study of popular representations of “gray goo,” there do not appear to be two obvious 
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sides in conflict in the nanotechnology debate, with no definitive spokesperson or 
group for proponents and for skeptics. In scientific circles, much has been made of the 
heated debates between Eric Drexler and Richard Smalley—a Nobel Prize-winning 
chemist with a drastically different vision for nanotechnology than Drexler’s (Baum, 
2003). But the popular media have not picked up on this, perhaps because the debate 
centers mostly on highly technical disagreements about the fundamental principles of 
nanotechnology. Gray goo is an eminently plausible popular metaphor (remember The 
Blob), but according to Thurs, the media just has not grabbed it. Interestingly, Thurs 
does suggest that there is not so much a fear of gray goo portrayed in the media, but 
rather a fear of the public having a fear of gray goo. In a sense, public opinion is the 
gray goo, he says. Public opinion is seen as a capricious and powerful force, which is 
difficult to hold back once it gains momentum. This further illustrates the increasing 
prominence of the “public accountability” frame in media coverage, which is perhaps 
mirroring the lingering taste of the GM food controversy in scientists’ mouths. 
What, if anything, will eventually define nanotechnology in the public and the 
media, since it does not seem to have been the release of Prey or the gray goo 
metaphor? Perhaps it will not be some environmental calamity or icon of popular 
culture, but rather a shift from administrative science contexts to more overtly political 
contexts, as Nisbet et al. (2003) suggested was the driving force behind media 
coverage of stem cell research. When policy debate is located within an administrative 
policy arena, only a few actors have a seat at the table, and policymaking has been 
described as following an “inside access” mode of agenda-setting (Nisbet, 2003). For 
these actors, it is in their best interest to exclude wider public involvement in the issue, 
and they typically frame it in narrowly technical terms, which leads to minimal media 
coverage. When another group that is linked to the issue finds themselves 
disadvantaged and without a seat at the policy table, these actors push for expansion of 
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the issue by attempting to shift the debate to more overtly political arenas. This 
process has been called “outside access” agenda-setting, and it can move the debate 
from behind closed doors into the public eye. Framing in this context is usually 
characterized by emotionally charged symbols, as opposed to the technical framing of 
the “inside access” mode. Research has demonstrated that the shift in framing of an 
issue from technical terms to moral terms is a key element in media coverage and 
public opinion about science-related controversies (Nisbet, 2003). 
For the stem cell controversy, Nisbet et al. (2003) suggested that insider 
scientists initially wanted to keep the discussion technical until a group of outsiders 
chose to raise the public profile, leading to “moral panic” and heightened media 
coverage. Interestingly, media coverage of nanotechnology has certainly spiked in 
recent years, but without any readily apparent outside initiatives, other than a few 
reports—such as those from the ETC Group—that have not seemed to garner large 
amounts of media coverage. The issue arguably still resides in an administrative 
science context, yet something has spurred growing media attention. One possibility is 
that the unique nature of nanotechnology development, with its early focus on societal 
implications, is responsible for the change. In this instance, the insiders have made it 
an explicit goal to include the public in the technology’s development from the outset, 
rather than keeping the issue hidden behind closed doors to avoid moral panic over 
potential risks. This might be why the media coverage is so high and growing, even 
though there is no real narrative for journalists to hang their stories on. This might also 
explain why the media coverage is so overwhelmingly positive and focused on 
economic development.  
The idea of a “shared culture” between science journalists and scientists does 
seem to be in effect with nanotechnology, as the tone of coverage reflects a decidedly 
uncritical take on the view of prominent scientists and institutions that see 
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nanotechnology as primarily about commercial benefit. Much of the reporting about 
nanotechnology follows quite closely with Nelkin’s (1987) description:  
Conveyed in these reports is a sense of awe about the power of technology, 
resembling in some ways the presentation of science in the press. But there is a 
difference: whereas science appears in the press as an ultimate authority, 
technology appears as the cutting edge of history, as the new frontier. . . . [T]he 
coverage of technology is mainly promotional; the dominant message 
conveyed is that the new development will give society the magic to cure 
economic or social ills. (pg. 34) 
 On an anecdotal level, there does seem to be growing evidence that media 
coverage is shifting from this progress/economic prospects frame to a more prominent 
focus on the societal impacts of nanotechnology. A major theme in recent years has 
been the potential environmental and health effects of nanotechnology—and 
specifically nanomaterials. Two particular events triggered spikes in stories: a 2004 
study by researchers at Southern Methodist University suggesting that buckyballs 
could cause brain damage in large-mouth bass; and a 2006 report that a spate of 
respiratory illnesses in German workers was caused by a cleaning product called 
MagicNano. Both incidents set off a number of feature stories in the ensuing months, 
allowing reporters to follow up on debates about the actual danger of buckyballs and 
whether MagicNano really contained any nanoparticles. The advent of these more 
introspective features suggests that journalists are beginning to ask more questions and 
think more skeptically about the nascent nanotechnology industry. 
This shift in focus just might lead to a shift in where the debate about 
nanotechnology takes place—from the administrative policy arena to a more overtly 
political context, pitting the forces of environmentalists and advocates for the public 
against corporate interests and even some scientists. Still, such a shift does not 
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compare in magnitude with the way issues like climate change and stem cell research 
have been catapulted to the media stage. It remains to be seen if the new focus on 
environmental and health effects of nanotechnology will really cause nanotechnology 
to become a major force in public discourse. 
Of course, media coverage cannot really be well understood without examining 
its linkage to public opinion. The two are inextricably linked, although precisely how 
is a matter of some debate. Unfortunately, the funds were not available to include 
media-related variables in this survey, but several other studies have looked more 
closely at the connection between media coverage and public opinion about 
nanotechnology, offering a good baseline to begin the discussion of media effects. 
In 2004, the Royal Society claimed that low awareness among the public 
“implies that much will hinge upon how attitudes to nanotechnologies are shaped over 
the next few years.” And the Royal Society report emphasizes the role of the media in 
shaping attitudes. This has become a bit of a truism—that the tone and amount of 
media coverage directly affects people’s attitudes toward (and therefore support for) 
science and technology. But is it in fact true? Or put another way: Is it possible that 
the general public support for nanotechnology, despite very low levels of knowledge 
and awareness, is an effect of the overwhelmingly positive media coverage focusing 
on progress and economic prospects? 
As might be expected, the answer, according to the few studies that have 
looked at this, is maybe. Scheufele and Lewenstein (2005), for example, found that 
public attitudes toward nanotechnology in their survey were heavily influenced by the 
amount and nature of media coverage, with the most influence coming from science 
news coverage in newspapers, on television, and online. A respondent’s knowledge 
about nanotechnology did not have much effect on their attitude, but their exposure to 
science-related news did. 
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In an investigation of U.S. citizens’ concerns about nanotechnology 
development, Macoubrie (2006) found that people’s concerns were largely based on 
experiential knowledge about past “breakthroughs” whose limitations and negative 
effects were poorly understood initially, and even when these effects became well-
known, they were poorly managed. If supporters of nanotechnology want to avoid a 
backlash like that which occurred against genetically modified foods, then they would 
do well to pay attention to the lessons learned from these past issues. According to 
Scheufele (2005), one of the main lessons from the debates surrounding genetically 
modified foods and stem cell research is that the public does not think like scientists. 
“Michael J. Fox, Ron Reagan and the Christian Coalition have probably had a more 
profound influence on public opinion about stem cell research than any scientific fact. 
And based on all we know about how people gather and process information, things 
won’t change anytime soon” (p. 1). 
Citizens use heuristics, or cognitive shortcuts, when dealing with emerging 
technologies, rather than trying to understand all the complexities of an issue. It makes 
sense for people to use this kind of “low-information rationality,” Scheufele notes, 
because they must rely on the information most easily available to them amid the 
torrent of potential options. And it is important to realize that people rely on these 
heuristics in addition to information when making decisions about issues such as 
nanotechnology. Thus media and education campaigns cannot be sufficient if the 
campaigners do not understand how people actually receive information. 
Importantly, Scheufele and Lewenstein (2005) found that information and 
heuristics can clash. In their national survey, both informed and uninformed supporters 
of nanotechnology reported lower levels of religiosity than the two segments of people 
who opposed nanotechnology. And the segment reporting the highest levels of 
religiosity were the informed opponents—the people who were generally opposed to 
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nanotechnology, even though they were significantly more informed about the issue 
than more than half of the population. They suggest that citizens use value systems 
and predispositions as “perceptual filters” when making sense of a new technology 
such as nanotechnology. 
When synthesized with other research, the findings presented in this thesis 
suggest that a “heuristic/framing model” is more relevant to people’s decision-making 
process with regard to nanotechnology than a “deficit model” or “science literacy 
model.” The general public support for nanotechnology—despite very low levels of 
knowledge and awareness—may be linked to the overwhelmingly positive media 
coverage, which has been consistently framed in terms of progress and economic 
prospects. But the linkage most likely occurs through the “perceptual filters” of value 
systems and predispositions. In combination with their preconceived attitudes about 
technology in general, people may be taking cues from the media to tell them how to 
think about this new emerging technology. The media coverage is providing clues 
about what aspects of nanotechnology are important—in this case, that it is primarily a 
story about economic competitiveness and technological progress. 
This corresponds with recent research in social psychology, political science, 
and risk communication, which suggests that knowledge plays a marginal role at best 
in shaping people’s opinions and attitudes about science and technology (Scheufele, 
2006). Future studies of media effects related to nanotechnology—and emerging 
technologies in general—could use this model as a basis for more rigorous 
examinations of the connections among media coverage, public opinion, and the 
policy arena. Specifically, studies should focus on the effects of knowledge and 
awareness on support for technology, in conjunction with mediating factors such as 
cues from news coverage, trust, values, and other predispositions about science and 
 80 
technology. Understanding these aspects is crucial to effective science communication 
in today’s rapidly changing media, public opinion, and policy landscape. 
 
Postscript: February 2008 
The research that forms the basis of this study was completed in 2005, and the 
text of the thesis was finalized in early 2006. It presents a snapshot of current 
knowledge at that time, but several developments that bear mention have occurred in 
the intervening years: 
1) Framing scholarship has continued to advance, and the concept of “framing 
science” has recently entered a much more public venue, spurred primarily by twin 
editorials in The Washington Post and Science magazine, along with an extended 
companion article in The Scientist magazine (Nisbet & Mooney, 2007a; Nisbet & 
Mooney, 2007b; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2007). These articles have caused a heated 
debate in the scientific community, and especially in the blogosphere. Many scientists 
and science enthusiasts have openly embraced the concept (e.g., Gallagher, 2007), but 
others find it utterly offensive, suggesting that “framing” is simply a euphemism for 
“spin.” 
The argument goes like this: Contrary to what many scientists might believe, 
research shows that citizens are rarely well enough informed or motivated to weigh 
competing arguments and draw up reasoned conclusions. When faced with a daily 
torrent of news, people use their value predispositions as perceptual screens, reducing 
the choices of what they pay attention to or accept as valid. Therefore scientists must 
learn to actively “frame” information about highly contested issues to make them 
relevant to different audiences, without misrepresenting the scientific information 
(Nisbet & Mooney, 2007a). The standard criticism is that this is a model more for 
politicians than for scientists. Scientists should not trade their reliance on fact-based 
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arguments for ones more slanted toward the interests of specific groups (Holland, 
2007). The debate continues, but progress is being made. Both sides seem to agree to 
the need for a constructive dialogue about this important topic. Scientists have long 
had a tendency to treat communication as an afterthought, so it is a welcome 
development to see it launched to the top of their agenda. 
2) New studies about the interactions between public opinion and media 
coverage of nanotechnology have emerged. These studies all generally support the 
preliminary conclusions presented in this thesis: awareness remains low, although it is 
growing; attitudes are generally positive; and the relationship between knowledge, 
understanding, and support is complicated—in part by the role of the media. 
McComas et al. (2007) presented preliminary results from a summer 2006 mail 
survey of residents in Tompkins and Ontario counties in New York State. The survey 
explored how individual views about local scientists and scientific research may affect 
support for several areas of emerging science, including agricultural biotechnology, 
agricultural nanotechnology, and gene therapy. The researchers included similar 
questions about nanotechnology to those presented in this thesis, and they obtained 
similar responses. The majority of respondents did not consider themselves well 
informed about nanotechnology, and of those who were willing to make an 
assessment, the majority supported the use of nanotechnology in commercial 
applications and thought the benefits would outweigh the risks. Still, as in the findings 
presented in this thesis, about half of all respondents would not make an assessment 
regarding the applications or benefits verses risks. 
National telephone surveys conducted in 2006 and 2007 by the project on 
Emerging Nanotechnologies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 
both found that Americans’ awareness of nanotechnology remains low. In 2007, only 
6% of Americans said they had “heard a lot” about nanotechnology, as compared with 
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10% in 2006. In 2007, 21% said they had “heard some” about nanotechnology, 
unchanged from the previous year. Similarly, as in 2006, about 70% of adults said 
they had heard “just a little” or “nothing at all” (Hart, 2007).  
Only 7% of respondents said they would purchase food enhanced with 
nanotechnology, while slightly more (12%) said they would buy food-storage 
containers enhanced with nanotechnology. Substantial majorities said they need more 
information about health risks and benefits before deciding whether to purchase such 
products. Adults who had heard a lot about nanotechnology were almost three times 
more likely to use food storage products enhanced with nanotechnology (31% 
compared to 11%), and were two-and-a-half times more likely to use foods enhanced 
with nanotechnology (15% compared to 6%). About half (51%) of the respondents 
were unwilling to make any judgment about the anticipated risks and benefits of 
nanotechnology, and another quarter thought risks and benefits will be about equal. Of 
the remainder, 18% said benefits will outweigh risks and 6% thought risks will exceed 
benefits. 
Lee and Scheufele (2006) used data from a national telephone survey to 
examine the pathways between different types of media use and attitudes toward 
nanotechnology, particularly potential mediating roles of nanotechnology knowledge 
and trust in scientists. The goal was to identify specific heuristics the public uses when 
making decisions about nanotechnology, clarifying the linkages from science media 
use to public attitudes. They found that science media use had direct links with public 
attitudes toward nanotechnology, as well as indirect effects through knowledge and 
“deference toward scientific authority”—a construct which suggests that citizens 
should not develop their own ideas about what is good or bad relative to a scientific 
controversy when legitimate authorities have already laid down the rules. In essence, 
deference to scientific authority boils down to trust in scientists and scientific 
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institutions. Lee and Scheufele also found that television science use was associated 
with public attitudes through deference toward scientific authority, whereas the 
influences of newspaper science use are at least partly mediated by nanotechnology 
knowledge. However, respondents used the Web differently: as a complementary tool 
for gathering additional information because mass media coverage of nanotechnology 
is still minimal. 
Scheufele et al. (2007) compared responses from 1,015 adults and 363 
nanoscientists in the United States. Not surprisingly, they found that researchers 
working on nanoscience and nanotechnology were more optimistic than the general 
public about the potential benefits of research in their field, such as the potential for 
nanotechnology to lead to breakthroughs in medicine, environmental cleanup, or 
national defense. However, scientists expressed more concerns than the general public 
about two areas of potential risks: more pollution and new health problems as a result 
of nanotechnology. This makes nanotechnology unusual among emerging 
technologies in that scientists working directly with the technology express stronger 
concerns about specific potential risk areas than the general public does. 
Friedman and Egolf continued their longitudinal study of risks in 
nanotechnology media coverage. In their first study (Friedman & Egolf, 2005), they 
found that health and environmental risks related to nanotechnology did not dominate 
U.S. or U.K. newspaper and wire service coverage of nanotechnology from January 
2000 through December 2004. The majority of the articles in the study were balanced, 
describing risks with both positive and negative information. From these results, they 
concluded that the mild concern about risks clearly did not counterbalance the 
overwhelming number of positive stories about the benefits and promises of 
nanotechnology. However, in preliminary results from their latest iteration (Friedman 
& Egolf, 2007), they found that coverage of nanotechnology risks in 2006 was almost 
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twice the amount from the previous year. Almost 50% of all articles about risk 
regulations in the United States were based on calls for regulatory action by interest 
groups, non-profits, and think tanks. More than a third of all reasons provided in 
support of increased regulatory oversight were to “protect the environment” and to 
“protect people’s health and safety.” These findings provide additional context for the 
Scheufele et al. (2007) study of nanoscientist opinions, suggesting that the higher level 
of concern among scientists may be driving an increased focus on environmental, 
health, and safety topics in the mass media. 
Even as coverage of nanotechnology grows, it still remains a very small part of 
the overall media landscape, especially when compared with scientific controversies 
such as climate change and stem cell research. What, if anything, will eventually 
define nanotechnology in the public and the media? Will it be a major environmental, 
health, or safety incident? Or perhaps a high-profile political debate? One recent 
development, in combination with the increased focus on risk in media coverage, 
highlights the type of framing that could be successful in elevating nanotechnology on 
the public agenda. Some critics of nanotechnology have begun referring to it as the 
“asbestos of tomorrow,” alluding to the potential unknown and long-term risks 
connected with nanoparticles. This metaphor is a highly effective way of using 
asbestos to evoke an existing interpretive frame that many people share (Scheufele, 
2006). If critics of nanotechnology combine this framing with continued calls for more 
regulation, this could lead to a shift in where the debate about nanotechnology takes 
place—from the administrative policy arena to a more overtly political context, pitting 
the forces of environmentalists and advocates for the public against corporate interests 
and even some scientists. Media attention to a scientific issue often peaks when the 
issue can be easily dramatized, which may correspond to a shift from administrative 
contexts to overtly political arenas. Such a shift in issue definition often entails a shift 
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in which type of journalist will cover a story, with a move from writers on the science 
beat to more general-assignment and political reporters (Nisbet et al., 2003). 
3) This leads to another development that has taken place behind the scenes of 
media coverage about science and technology. Cutbacks in the news business, 
particularly newspapers, have meant a decline in the number of jobs for fulltime staff 
science writers. A number of longtime science reporters have taken “buyouts” and 
moved to freelance or other career options. The cutbacks also have led to a drop in the 
number of weekly science sections. Those that remain have increasingly become 
consumer-oriented sections that specialize more in soft health and fitness trends than 
research information based on scientific studies. Newspaper science sections rose to 
prominence in the late 1980s as a popular venue for in-depth science coverage, 
reaching a peak of 95 sections in 1989. Since then, they have been dropping in number 
and size, particularly among smaller papers. Those that remain have shifted 
dramatically toward softer consumer-oriented, “news you can use” medicine and 
personal health coverage. Thirty-four American newspapers listed weekly health and 
science sections in the 2005 Editor and Publisher International Yearbook, with more 
than two-thirds focused primarily on health (Russell, 2006). 
Despite a great deal of hand-wringing over these developments, it is not yet 
clear what the implications are for science communication. On some fronts, the 
demise of dedicated science sections is seen as positive. Some critics, including 
science reporters themselves, question the need for separate sections, arguing that they 
have the danger of preaching to the converted by sequestering important science and 
health coverage in a section that may be read primarily by readers who are already 
interested in science (Russell, 2006).  
Some reporters and editors feel that science coverage needs to be pushed to the 
front of the paper, competing in the news section with other national and international 
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stories, and that science writers themselves need to be stronger advocates for science 
and technology coverage. Science has taken center stage in an ever-growing array of 
complex and often controversial public policy issues, such as climate change, stem 
cell research, genetically modified foods, and the teaching of evolution in public 
schools. Science is increasingly being covered in a variety of beats, including 
education, business, investigative reporting, religion, agriculture, politics, and foreign 
coverage. Perhaps the definition of “science writer” needs to be expanded to embrace 
the coverage of science in the larger context of societal and public policy issues. 
This notion echoes the calls by Nisbet, Scheufele, and others that scientists 
need to be more willing to jump into the fray of media coverage. With fewer dedicated 
science reporters and editorial sections, scientists and scientific institutions need to 
think about ways to engage non-specialist reporters and to reach broader audiences in 
the public. And to a certain extent, this seems to be happening. Institutional public 
information offices as well as scientific professional organizations are increasingly 
promoting media training and outreach for scientists. For example, at the 2008 annual 
meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the 
AAAS Center for Public Engagement with Science and Technology, in partnership 
with the National Science Foundation, announced a new Web site for scientists and 
engineers who communicate science with public audiences. The purpose of the Web 
site is to encourage scientists and engineers to proactively interact with the news 
media and the public by offering relevant tools for improving communication and 
discovering broader outreach opportunities. 
4) The fourth and final development is that the author has found himself 
working as a professional in the field of scientific and university public relations. In an 
effort to bridge the gap between communication scholarship and practice, this thesis 
will close with a brief discussion of implications for practitioners of strategic 
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communication, especially those working in fields related to nanotechnology and other 
emerging technologies. 
As mentioned above, the decline of science reporting offers both challenges 
and opportunities for professional science communicators. There are fewer traditional 
outlets for dedicated science news, but new media technologies offer tremendous 
prospects for expanding science coverage, allowing scientists and institutions to reach 
the public directly through blogs, videos, and other online content. Strategic 
communicators should continue exploring and tapping these outlets, but they must 
remember that audiences use different media in different ways. For example, Lee and 
Scheufele (2006) found that television science use was associated with public attitudes 
toward nanotechnology through trust in scientists, whereas the influences of 
newspaper science use are at least partly mediated by nanotechnology knowledge. 
However, respondents used the Web differently: as a complementary tool for 
gathering additional information because mass media coverage of nanotechnology is 
still minimal. These and other considerations must be a part of any communication 
strategy that involves the Web. 
Journalists do not typically consider themselves to be educators, but 
communicators at scientific institutions often see education as part of their roles as 
advocates for science and technology. With fewer science reporting specialists, editors 
do not have the time or the resources to vet scientific information as it comes across 
the transom. Many Web-based news outlets, for example, have taken to re-writing 
press releases from scientific institutions and posting them with no original reporting 
or fact-checking. As science coverage becomes even more heavily reliant on public 
information officers and other information directly from scientific institutions, 
professional communicators have an opportunity (and perhaps an obligation) to 
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engage with reporters outside of the science beat to help them understand why science 
and technology matter. 
This is where framing comes in. Most reporters outside of the science beat are 
accustomed to having information packaged in certain ways, and strategic 
communicators—especially in politics and business—have become quite savvy in this 
regard. They realize that it’s not what you say, but how you say it that really matters. 
If scientific institutions are to build and maintain their relevance in the current media 
landscape, then they need to develop a better understanding of how public opinion is 
formed and of how individuals make sense of emerging technologies. If people make 
decisions using low-information rationality, then science communicators need to 
frame their messages in ways that will resonate with the public. Increasingly, this 
means taking a page from the book used by political strategists—speaking in sound 
bytes and symbols that resonate with personal experience or social values. Facts alone 
are not enough to educate people, but rather facts must be carefully packaged to wield 
the maximum impact. Despite criticisms of the so-called “deficit model,” the 
foregoing study suggests that people do in fact use information to form opinions about 
issues related to science and technology. But there are several other potential factors 
that can act to mediate the effects of knowledge and awareness about a certain issue. 
Some of these factors include media coverage, which can tell readers which issues are 
important (salience), as well as which aspects of certain issues are important 
(framing); general attitudes about science and technology, which may be based on past 
experiences and exposure to scientific issues; trust in various individuals and 
institutions, including the business community and government officials; religious 
beliefs; political ideology; value systems; and emotions. Each mediating factor may 
have a particular impact when applied to different subjects. 
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For the issue of nanotechnology, the research presented here suggests that 
certain approaches to framing may work better than others. Critics have increasingly 
had success by focusing on the unknown long-term health effects of nanotechnology, 
with a particular emphasis on the asbestos analogy. The asbestos frame works well 
because it evokes an existing interpretive frame that many people share and 
understand; it is difficult to counter since it refers to risks that we will not be aware of 
until decades down the road; it calls to mind prior instances of regulatory 
incompetence; and it gives journalists an easy way to discuss risks in their stories. It is 
important to remember that framing is not just used by strategic communicators, but it 
also can be a tool for journalists to organize their stories and make their jobs easier. 
To counter the critics, proponents of nanotechnology have a few options. One 
recent approach is that companies are marketing nanotechnology-based products as 
“natural.” The emphasis here is that they are not “playing God,” but rather that they 
are creating products that are “inspired by nature.” By emphasizing the approach as 
mimicking nature, not controlling it, these companies are contrasting nanotechnology 
with biotechnology and genetically modified foods.  
In the United States, science and technology have long been framed in terms of 
economic prospects and social progress, and this approach still seems to offer a 
number of opportunities—especially in a country that is increasingly focused on 
staying competitive on the global playing field. Nisbet and Scheufele (2007) suggest 
that the issue of stem cell research highlights one recent success in the realm of 
framing science. Proponents of stem cell research have countered criticisms based on 
moral concerns by suggesting that not pursuing this research can have significant 
impacts on regions, states, and the entire country in the competition for technological 
and economic dominance. This approach may also work for nanotechnology, 
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especially in areas of the country that have struggled to shift from manufacturing-
based economies to knowledge-based economies. 
A final approach that may be beneficial to proponents of nanotechnology is a 
continued emphasis on building trust. Industry and university scientists are 
increasingly realizing that the vast promise of new technologies like nanotechnology 
does not press forward in a vacuum, and that the public needs to be engaged 
“upstream” in development to discuss the challenges and opportunities presented by 
new technologies. As the research presented here suggests, the “public accountability” 
frame is playing a significant role in media coverage of nanotechnology. Proponents 
would do well to focus on messages and activities that build trust. As noted 
previously, Lee and Scheufele (2006) found that science media use had direct links 
with public attitudes toward nanotechnology, as well as indirect effects through 
knowledge and “deference toward scientific authority”—a construct which suggests 
that citizens should not develop their own ideas about what is good or bad relative to a 
scientific controversy when legitimate authorities have already laid down the rules. In 
essence, deference to scientific authority boils down to trust in scientists and scientific 
institutions. 
Of course, it is important to emphasize that institutional representatives 
naturally have interests beyond simply promoting nanotechnology as a public good. A 
critical question must be addressed: What is the difference between “framing” and 
“spin”? In essence, the difference lies in the realm of motivations. To “spin” is to 
purposely emphasize or de-emphasize certain information for the purpose of 
deception. While this may be a simple distinction, determining where the line exists in 
practice is a much more complicated project—one that falls outside the realm of 
objective social science and into the arena of ethics. 
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